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Abstract 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the Act) creates a temporary tax holiday that 
effectively reduces the U.S. tax rate on repatriations from foreign subsidiaries from 35 percent to 
5.25 percent.  Firms receive the reduced tax rate by electing to take an 85 percent dividends 
received deduction on repatriations in 2004 or 2005.  This paper investigates the characteristics 
of firms that repatriate under the Act and how they use the repatriated funds.  We find that firms 
that repatriate under the Act have lower investment opportunities and higher free cash flows than 
non-repatriating firms.  Further, we find that repatriating firms increase share repurchases during 
2005 by $55.80 to $60.85 billion more than non-repatriating firms. This increase represents 
19.14 to 20.87 percent of the $291.6 billion repatriated under the Act.  This paper provides useful 
information to policy makers about the effect of a temporary tax holiday on firms’ investment 
behavior.    
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, U.S. multinational corporations’ profits surged as growth in global 
markets outpaced domestic growth.1  This international expansion led to record foreign profits 
for U.S. firms, which remain invested overseas unless repatriated to the United States.  To 
encourage firms to invest these profits in the U.S., the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the 
Act) temporarily decreases the tax burden on repatriations of foreign earnings by effectively 
reducing the maximum tax rate on overseas profits from 35 percent to 5.25 percent.  Firms 
receive the reduced tax rate by electing to take an 85 percent dividends received deduction on 
repatriations of foreign earnings in either 2004 or 2005.  
Because the intent of the legislation is to increase domestic investment, firms must have a 
plan to use funds remitted during the tax holiday for such purposes as capital expenditures, 
research and development, debt repayment, and certain merger and acquisition activity. 
Subsequent guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) specifically disallows using 
the funds for dividends, share repurchases, and executive compensation.  Initial estimates 
indicate that firms could repatriate up to $426 billion under the Act (Albring, Dzuranin, and 
Mills 2005). Although this estimate suggests that the Act will move large amounts of cash into 
U.S. investments, anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are using the repatriated funds to 
repurchase shares, one of the purposes specifically disallowed by the IRS.2      
We study the characteristics of firms that repatriate under the Act and how they use those 
funds.  Existing theory regarding repatriation of foreign earnings finds that taxes on unremitted 
                                                 
1 “U.S. Multinationals Reap Overseas Bounty”, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 2005, A2. 
2 See for example, “Buybacks Soar; Firms Deny a Link to Repatriated Profit-Tax-Break”, Wall Street Journal, 
October 24, 2005, A2.  As another example, the following quote is from “Postcards From a Tax Holiday”, The New 
York Times, November 12, 2005:  “Hewlett-Packard has announced a repatriation of $14.5 billion, layoffs of 14,500 
workers and stock buybacks of more than $4 billion for the first half of 2005, about three times the size of its 
buybacks in the period a year earlier.” 
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foreign earnings do not affect repatriations when tax rates and after-local-tax returns are 
constant.  Under these assumptions, firms will repatriate when the after-tax return abroad is low 
relative to the after-tax return in the United States (Hartman 1985; Scholes et al. 2005).3  We 
extend this theoretical framework to incorporate the temporary tax holiday and argue that, 
because the Act does not change the after-local-tax returns to investment, firms likely to 
repatriate under the Act are those with limited investment opportunities in both the U.S. and 
abroad.  Therefore, distributing the repatriated cash to shareholders is the economically efficient 
outcome for many firms that benefit from the tax holiday.   
Because the nature of the Act is a one-time only tax holiday, we expect that firms are 
more likely to increase repurchases than dividends.  Repurchases are an effective method for 
distributing a positive transitory shock to cash flow since they do not imply a commitment to 
make regular distributions (Guay and Harford 2000).  Furthermore, unlike dividends, open 
market repurchases do not require a formal announcement thereby increasing the opacity of 
shareholder distributions made with repatriated funds.   
We test our predictions by investigating the investment opportunities, free cash flows, 
and payout behavior of firms that disclose their repatriation intentions under the Act.  Financial 
reporting rules require firms considering repatriation under the Act to disclose a summary of the 
repatriation provision as it applies to the firm, estimates of possible amounts of repatriation, and 
the related tax effects.4  We perform a search of SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings from October 22, 
2004 through September 30, 2006 for disclosures of firms’ repatriation plans.  Ultimately, we 
identify 357 firms that repatriate a total of $291.6 billion under the Act.   
                                                 
3 Though the theory suggests that only after-tax returns affect the decision to repatriate, this result relies on the 
assumption that taxes and returns are constant.  A large empirical literature finds evidence that taxes affect 
repatriations (Hines and Hubbard 1990; Desai, Foley, and Hines 2001; Altshuler and Newlon 1993; Grubert 1998) 
and that this effect relates to inter-temporal changes in tax rates (Altshuler, Newlon and Randolph 1995). 
4 See the Financial Accounting Standards Board Staff Position No. 109-2 (FSP 109-2). 
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Using a sample of 357 repatriating and 2,339 non-repatriating firms, we find evidence 
consistent with repatriating firms facing limited investment opportunities.  Specifically, we find 
that the probability that a firm repatriates under the Act is increasing in free cash flows and 
decreasing in the changes in return on assets and market to book ratio in the years leading up to 
the Act.  If firms that repatriate have limited investment opportunities, then we further expect 
that repatriating firms will distribute repatriated earnings in an effort to mitigate agency 
concerns.  Although we find evidence that total repurchases across all multinational firms 
increase in 2005, the mean increase in repurchases for repatriating firms is $224 million 
compared to only $18 million for non-repatriating firms.  Using a Compustat (CRSP) measure of 
repurchases, we estimate that, after controlling for other predictors of repurchases, repatriating 
firms increase share repurchases during 2005 by $60.85 billion ($55.80 billion) more than non-
repatriating firms.5  This increase represents 20.87 (19.14) percent of the total amount of 
repatriations under the Act reported by our sample firms ($291.6 billion). 
This study makes three important contributions.  First, this paper contributes to our 
understanding of the effect of the Act on firm behavior, and should be of interest to policy 
makers. Other studies that investigate the Act focus on the valuation effects of the tax holiday.  
De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) model the effects of a tax holiday on the market valuation of 
foreign earnings reinvested in foreign assets and the related deferred tax liabilities.  They show 
that the value of a foreign subsidiary that repatriates during a tax holiday increases by the amount 
of tax savings under the holiday. Consistent with the theory in De Waegenaere and Sansing 
(2008), Oler, Shevlin, and Wilson (2007) find that during the tax holiday, firms’ market values 
increase in the amount of potential tax savings under the Act.  In contrast, we investigate the 
                                                 
5 The mean increase in affected firms is 0.205 percent of assets per quarter and the cumulative assets for the affected 
firms is $3.340 trillion.  
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characteristics of firms that repatriate under the Act and how firms use these funds. We find 
evidence that, in spite of having plans to invest in approved activities, repatriating firms 
significantly increase payments to shareholders, and the amount of this increase is related to the 
amount of repatriation.  Although these results suggest that firms are using repatriated funds for a 
disallowed purpose, the Act does not require a direct tracing of the use of funds.  Due to the 
fungible nature of cash, firms could have made the investments stated in their reinvestment plan, 
but then used other freed up funds for share repurchases.  Though this may in some way violate 
the intention of the Act, these firms are putting overseas profits back into the U.S. economy – 
just not in the manner that Congress intended.  Whether distribution to shareholders is the 
preferred way to put the funds into the U.S. economy is subject to debate.6  Nonetheless, our 
results provide useful information about how firms respond to a temporary tax holiday. 
Second, the results of this study corroborate the evidence in existing studies that find that 
repatriation taxes are a binding constraint on firms’ cash management.  For example, Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) find that repatriation taxes help explain why multinational 
firms hold excess cash.  Consistent with Foley et al. (2007), we find evidence that the reduction 
of repatriation taxes induces firms with high free cash flows to bring foreign earnings back into 
the United States.  Furthermore, the large response to the tax holiday suggests that strategies to 
de-facto repatriate using complex organizational structures (e.g., cross-border special purposes 
entities) do not completely remove the constraint of repatriation taxes on intra-firm cash flows.   
Third, we contribute to the literature that investigates whether firms repurchase shares to 
reduce agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen 1986).  In a setting in which theory predicts 
                                                 
6 On one hand, the funds may be more quickly injected into the U.S. economy if they are paid out to shareholders 
rather than sitting in a corporate account waiting for board approval.  On the other hand, if the proceeds from the 
share repurchases are ultimately deposited into personal savings accounts then, at least in the near-term, the 
repatriated funds will not lead to incremental spending and, hence, job creation.   
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agency benefits from repatriation and subsequent distribution to shareholders, we find evidence 
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis.   Similar to Grullon and Michaely (2004) who 
examine firm performance and characteristics around share repurchases, the results of this study 
suggest that firms increase share repurchases to mitigate over-investment.  In addition, our work 
contributes to the debate on how firms use windfall profits/cash flow (Blanchard, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 1994; Bates 2005).  We provide evidence that at least some of the cash 
brought back into the U.S. is not over-invested but is remitted to shareholders to alleviate 
potential agency concerns.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides background on 
tax and accounting rules for foreign subsidiary earnings.  Section 3 develops our hypotheses.  
Section 4 describes the analysis of aggregate Flow of Funds data, Section 5 describes the firm-
level analysis of characteristics of repatriating firms and payout behavior, and Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Summary of Repatriation Taxes and the Tax Holiday 
 Under U.S. tax law, multinational firms pay taxes on foreign earnings upon repatriation 
of the earnings to the U.S. at a rate equal to the U.S. tax rate.  The U.S. tax liability on dividend 
repatriations equals the dividend grossed up for foreign taxes paid times the U.S. tax rate.  To 
reduce the potential for double taxation, the firm can decrease the U.S. tax liability by foreign 
taxes paid. This foreign tax credit is calculated on a world-wide basis for all foreign source 
income, rather than a country by country basis, and equals the lesser of the amount of foreign 
taxes paid on foreign income or U.S. taxes on foreign income.  Therefore, a firm with an average 
foreign tax rate greater than the U.S. tax rate generally owes no U.S. taxes on repatriations of 
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foreign earnings.  A firm with an average foreign tax rate less than the U.S. tax rate generally 
owes U.S. taxes on repatriated earnings at a rate equal to the difference between the U.S. and 
foreign tax rates.7 
 The Act was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 25, 2003, in the Senate 
on September 18, 2003, and eventually signed by President Bush on October 22, 2004. The Act 
creates a one-time tax incentive for U.S. multinational companies to remit foreign earnings to the 
U.S. by reducing the U.S. tax rate on repatriations of foreign earnings.  This reduced tax rate is 
structured as an 85 percent dividends received deduction on eligible dividends received from 
controlled foreign corporations in either 2004 or 2005.  Because the maximum U.S. tax rate 
during this period is 35 percent, the dividends received deduction reduces the maximum tax rate 
on repatriations to 5.25 percent.   
Though the Act originated as a measure to address the World Trade Organization’s ruling 
that export tax incentives in place at the time constituted an illegal export subsidy, Congress 
added the temporary reduction in repatriation taxes to the bill as a means to increase jobs in the 
United States. In accordance with this intent, the Act includes restrictions on the amount of funds 
eligible for the dividends received deduction as well as on the intended use of the funds in the 
United States.   
First, the Act limits the amount eligible for the dividends received deduction to 
extraordinary dividends, defined as the excess of repatriations during the year over the average 
amount of repatriations during the previous five years, excluding the highest and lowest years.  
All else equal, firms that have been systematically repatriating in the past will not benefit as 
                                                 
7 Because the foreign tax credit limitation is calculated on a world-wide basis, firms can use excess credits from high 
tax rate countries to offset the U.S. tax liability on repatriations from low tax rate countries.  The ability to cross-
credit creates an incentive to time repatriations from low tax rate countries to coincide with repatriations from high 
tax rate countries.  However, cross-crediting is limited by foreign tax credit baskets based on the type of income.  
For a more detailed discussion of U.S. taxation of foreign income, see Scholes et al. (2005). 
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much under the Act as firms that have never repatriated.  The Act further limits the eligible 
dividend amount to the greater of (1) $500 million, (2) the earnings reported as permanently 
reinvested on the last audited financial statements filed on or before June 30, 2003, or (3) if the 
amount of permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) is not reported, the amount of U.S. tax 
liability attributable to PRE reported in the last audited financial statements filed on or before 
June 30, 2003, divided by 0.35.8  The Act also reduces the amount eligible for the dividends 
received deduction by any increase in related-party debt incurred by foreign subsidiaries between 
October 3, 2004 and the close of the tax year for which the firm claims the dividends received 
deduction. 
Second, to be eligible for the dividends received deduction, the dividends must be paid in 
cash and invested in the U.S. pursuant to a plan which is approved by the chief executive officer 
or comparable officer and the board of directors and which provides for reinvestment of the 
dividends in an approved use.  Approved uses of the funds include, but are not limited to, 
funding for hiring and training, infrastructure, research and development, capital investments, 
and financial stabilization for purposes of job retention and creation.  The Act only specifically 
prohibits using repatriated funds for executive compensation and does not require firms to 
demonstrate that repatriated funds are used for the purpose stated in the approved plan.9  
However, subsequent guidance issued by the IRS, Notice 2005-10, lists dividends, share 
                                                 
8 Accounting Principals Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23) defines PRE as the earnings of foreign subsidiaries that 
have been invested abroad indefinitely or that will be remitted in a tax-free liquidation. For financial reporting 
purposes, firms recognize the potential U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings when they report the foreign earnings, 
regardless of whether they repatriate the earnings to the U.S., resulting in a deferred tax liability in the amount of the 
potential U.S. taxes on future repatriations.  However, if the firm deems the foreign earnings as PRE, it is not 
required to record a deferred tax liability or recognize income tax expense for the potential U.S. tax liability on 
future repatriations.  If, or when, a firm changes its reinvestment plans and no longer considers the earnings 
indefinitely reinvested, it records an expense for the U.S. tax liability.  See Collins, Hand, and Shackelford (2001) 
and Krull (2004) for a discussion of firms’ decisions to designate foreign earnings as PRE. 
9 The temporary dividends received deduction is established in Internal Revenue Code Section 965.  See Blessing 
(2004) and Stoffregen, Lainoff, and Satkoski (2005) for a more technical discussion of the Section 965 requirements 
and limitations. 
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repurchases, tax payments, and purchases of debt instruments or a less-than-ten percent interest 
in a business entity as additional disallowed uses. The Notice states that tracing uses of the 
repatriated funds would be too difficult to administer and that there is no requirement that 
repatriated funds be used to incrementally increase spending for approved uses over amounts 
spent for those purposes in previous years.10   
 The decision to repatriate foreign earnings under the Act affects firms’ financial 
statements through its effect on income tax expense and deferred tax liabilities.  In the months 
following the Act, many firms requested additional guidance to clarify the application of the new 
tax laws including allowable uses of the repatriated funds and the calculation of the foreign tax 
credit for repatriations eligible for the dividends received deduction.  Because the application of 
the law was unclear, the financial statement effects were also unclear.  On December 21, 2004, 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FASB Staff Position No. 109-2 (FSP 
109-2) to provide accounting and disclosure guidance for amounts firms intend to repatriate 
under the Act.  FSP 109-2 requires firms that have not yet completed their evaluation of the 
effect of the Act on their reinvestment plans to disclose a summary of the repatriation provision 
as it applies to the firm, the effect on income tax expense for any amounts that will be repatriated 
under the Act, the range of reasonably possible amounts still being considered for repatriation 
                                                 
10 Congress intensely debated the list of approved uses included in the Act and the need to trace whether firms 
ultimately use the funds for the purpose stated in the approved plan.  On May 5, 2004, Senators Breaux and 
Feinstein introduced an amendment that would limit approved uses to wages, additions to capital accounts for 
property located within the U.S., research and development, and irrevocable contributions to a qualified employer 
plan. The amendment also included a provision that would require firms to trace where the money was spent and 
pay taxes and interest on any amounts not used for qualified expenditures.  Senator Breaux defended this measure 
stating that the amendment “…is about responsibility and accountability, about creating jobs in this country, not 
stock buybacks that enrich a few at the expense of jobs in this country.” (Congressional Record 2004) Opponents 
criticized the amendment by citing estimates that the tax holiday would generate 660,000 new jobs and stating that 
the narrow list of approved uses in the amendment would prevent firms from spending repatriated funds for job 
related expenses such as job training to upgrade skills, worker health, dental and hospital expenses, employee 
childcare, worker relocation reimbursements, and employee tuition assistance.  (Congressional Record 2004b)  The 
amendment was defeated, and the bill eventually enacted contains a non-exclusive list of approved uses but no 
requirement to trace the use of repatriated funds.  See Alexander and Scholz (2008) for a summary of the Act’s 
legislative history. 
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under the Act, and the range of income tax effects of such repatriation.  For the period during 
which a firm completes its evaluation of the Act, FSP 109-2 requires it to report the total effect 
on income tax expense (or benefit) for amounts that have been repatriated under the Act. 
 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
Hartman (1985) expresses the decision to invest abroad as a function of exogenous and 
constant foreign and domestic tax rates and risk-adjusted after-tax returns.  In the analysis that 
follows, we first summarize Hartman (1985) then extend this analysis to incorporate the 
temporary tax holiday.  Like Hartman, we assume that foreign and domestic after-tax returns on 
incremental investment projects, rf and rd, are exogenous and constant over time.  Thus, any 
change in taxation on repatriation does not affect the return on the incremental investment 
opportunity.  We also assume that the firm faces a cost of capital, r*, which is exogenous and 
constant over time, and that viable investment projects must return at least the cost of capital, 
i.e., rd, rf ≥ r*.  We further assume that domestic tax rates are higher than foreign tax rates.  
Though the converse may hold, firms with foreign tax rates greater than domestic tax rates are 
less likely to benefit from the reduction in the U.S. tax rate on repatriations. 
If a firm invests an amount, I, overseas, the investment yields the following accumulation 
after n periods: 
]1)1[( −+ nrfI        (1) 
where rf equals the risk-adjusted after-local-tax rate of return abroad.   
For a firm with foreign earnings on an existing foreign investment, the repatriation 
decision requires a comparison of the after-all-taxes returns to reinvesting the foreign earnings 
abroad and repatriating to the United States.  Allow EP to represent the cumulative amount of 
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foreign earnings on the initial investment (Equation (1)).  At the beginning of the next period, the 
firm decides whether to repatriate the earnings and invest them in the U.S. for n periods or 
reinvest them in foreign operations and repatriate after n periods. If the firm repatriates the 
earnings at the beginning of the period and invests the after-tax amount in the U.S. for n periods, 
at the end of the investment horizon the firm has: 
nnn rd
tf
tdEPrdtftd
tf
EPrdEP )1(
)1(
)1()1)((
)1(
)1( +−
−=+−−−+ , (2) 
Where td equals the domestic tax rate, tf equals the foreign tax rate, rd equals the risk-adjusted 
after-tax domestic rate of return, and td > tf. 
If instead the firm leaves the earnings abroad and then repatriates after n periods it has: 
nnn rf
tf
tdEPrftftd
tf
EPrfEP )1(
)1(
)1()1)((
)1(
)1( +−
−=+−−−+ . (3) 
A firm will repatriate at the beginning of the period when (2) > (3).11  This relation simplifies to 
a comparison of rd and rf.  Thus, firms will repatriate foreign earnings when the domestic after-
tax rate of return exceeds the foreign after-local-tax return, and the U.S. tax on repatriations does 
not influence the repatriation decision. (Hartman 1985; Scholes et al. 2005) 
Although the theory suggests that repatriation taxes do not affect the repatriation 
decision, existing studies show that dividend repatriations are sensitive to the tax cost of 
repatriating (Hines and Hubbard 1990; Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph 1995; Desai, Foley, and 
Hines 2001; Altshuler and Newlon 1993; Grubert 1998).  These studies argue that tax rates affect 
repatriations due to a firm’s ability to exploit temporary changes in the tax cost of repatriation by 
timing repatriations from low-tax countries to coincide with repatriations from high-tax countries 
(Clausing 2005).  In this study, we investigate the effect of a temporary change in statutory tax 
                                                 
11 In Equations (2) and (3) EP is grossed up by the foreign tax rate because U.S. firms pay U.S. taxes on their local 
pre-tax income. 
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rates on repatriations, which is incremental to intra-firm, inter-temporal variation in the tax cost 
of repatriations.   
We modify the Hartman (1985) analysis by incorporating the temporary effect of the Act 
on the tax cost of repatriating and by incorporating firms’ ability to borrow.  The Act allows a 
temporary 85 percent dividends received deduction for repatriations in 2004 or 2005.  Therefore, 
the Act changes the decision to reinvest versus repatriate because tax rates are not constant over 
time: the U.S tax rate on repatriations is lower if the firm repatriates during the tax holiday than 
if the firm reinvests the profits abroad and repatriates later.  We let tdo represent the U.S. tax on 
repatriations that benefit from the tax holiday.12  Assuming that repatriations at the beginning of 
the period benefit from the tax holiday, if the firm repatriates at the beginning of the period then 
reinvests the after-tax amount in the U.S., at the end of n periods it has: 
nnn rd
tf
tdoEPrdtftdo
tf
EPrdEP )1(
)1(
)1()1)((
)1(
)1( +−
−=+−−−+ , (4) 
where tdo < td.  Notice that (4) is equivalent to (2) with tdo replacing td.   
Because the tax holiday is not available when the firm reinvests its profits in the foreign 
country and repatriates after n periods, the amount the firm has if it repatriates after n periods is 
the same as Equation (3). The firm will repatriate at the beginning of the period as long as (4) > 
(3).  Therefore, the firm will repatriate immediately taking advantage of the tax holiday when: 
1
)1(
)1()1(
1
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+> n
tdo
tdrfrd .      (5) 
If the firm has an available project, rd, that meets the criteria of (5), then it has an incentive 
to repatriate under the Act.  However, an important caveat is that rd must equal or exceed r* for 
                                                 
12 The following details the computation of tdo. 
.85 .15 ( ) (1 .85 .15 )( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
S o , (.85 .15 )
E P E P E P td tf E P tf tdE P td tf td tf E P
tf tf tf tf
tdo tf td
− − −− − + − = − =− − − −
= +
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the firm to be willing to repatriate solely to invest in the United States.  Said another way, the 
Act does not change the return on the incremental investment project, rd, but rather decreases the 
cost of repatriating funds.  Therefore, existing shareholders receive a wind-fall gain through the 
increase in value attributable to the decrease in taxes on unremitted earnings previously 
impounded into price.  However, in our model, this increase in value is not accompanied by a 
decrease in the firm’s cost of capital, r*.13   
This caveat is illustrated by the following.  Assume that 1) if a firm has an investment 
opportunity it can borrow at rate i and invest in that project, where i equals the firm-specific 
after-tax cost of borrowing, and 2) the firm will invest in the project as long as the after-tax 
return is greater than the after-tax cost of borrowing.14  In addition, assume that i = r*15 and that 
there is no adverse selection component to i or r*.  Because the firm did not repatriate prior to 
the Act, when tdo was equal to td, we can infer that rd < rf.  Furthermore, as the firm did not 
borrow and invest in the incremental domestic investment opportunity, we can also infer that rd 
< i.  Therefore, for a firm to consider repatriating under the Act, the following relation must 
hold: 
   1
)1(
)1()1(
1
−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+>> n
tdo
tdrfrdi .     (6) 
Equation (6) implies that the return on the incremental project, rd, is also lower than r*.   
                                                 
13 For brevity, we assume that repatriating under the Act does not affect the cost of capital. This follows from our 
assumption that r* is constant and exogenous.  If we relax this assumption and allow repatriation to decrease the 
cost of capital, then repatriating under the Act will yield more potential investment projects having an rd that 
exceeds r* thereby spurring investment. However, it is likely that this increase in investment is small relative to the 
amounts that were repatriated under the Act. Furthermore, the presence of increasing investment opportunities 
creates a conservative bias in our empirical tests. 
14 We assume that i is identical across all countries and that the firm always has the option to use its overseas assets 
to secure its borrowing. 
15 This relation assumes that capital structure is irrelevant to firm value.  This relation also assumes that the cost of 
borrowing, i, is exogenous with respect to both the decision to repatriate and the decision to invest in the incremental 
project, i.e., that i is not dependent upon whether the incremental investment project is situated in the U.S or abroad.  
Furthermore, i is set independent of the shift in firms’ capital structure that results from the borrowing.  See Hines 
(1994) for a full equilibrium model of foreign investment that incorporates capital structure. 
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Notice that this relation implies that rd is low but not necessarily that rf is below i.  As the 
investment horizon increases the term in brackets approaches one. 16  Therefore, if rf is greater 
than i, the firm will not repatriate but will invest in the foreign country.  If rf is less than i then 
the firm’s EP could be trapped overseas, creating an agency problem if this EP is either in cash 
or over-invested in foreign assets (Jensen 1986).  Over-invested funds are, by definition, held in 
negative NPV projects, i.e. the return on investment is less than the discount rate.17  De 
Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) show that for some firms the cost of holding funds abroad in 
negative net present value projects is less than the cost of repatriating them, even without the 
prospect of a tax holiday. Consistent with this theoretical result, Foley, Hartzell, Titman and 
Twite (2007) find that holdings of cash and cash equivalents in foreign subsidiaries are 
increasing in the tax cost of repatriation.   
We investigate the extent to which repatriations under the Act are motivated by the need 
to disgorge excess cash trapped abroad. Our theory suggests that firms that take advantage of the 
tax holiday have limited investment opportunities in both the U.S. and abroad potentially leading 
to over-investment.  That is, the expected return on each incremental project available to the firm 
is low and so firms that benefit from repatriation face costs associated with excess cash/over-
investment.  For these firms, the cost of repatriation under U.S. tax laws in effect before the Act 
exceeds the cost of over-investment.  The tax holiday decreases the cost of repatriation, thus 
making repatriation cost-effective and creating the opportunity to bring home excess cash 
abroad.  To investigate our conjecture, we test the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
16 Equation (6) does not preclude a firm from investing in a project identified prior to the ACJA but whose logistical 
requirements led to a time delay which permitted the use of funds ultimately repatriated under the act to fund the 
project.   
17 These funds could be invested in passive assets such as stocks and bonds, in which case the firm can continue to 
defer the U.S. taxes on these funds but cannot defer U.S. taxes on the earnings from the passive investments. 
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 H1: The likelihood that a firm repatriates under the Act is increasing in its over-investment 
concerns as evidenced by limited investment opportunities and high free cash flows. 
 
Firms that benefit from the Act chose not to repatriate before the Act because domestic 
investment opportunities are limited (rd ≤ rf).  If domestic opportunities are limited, then 
repatriation of foreign funds does not eliminate the over-investment problem.  When a firm’s 
capital exceeds its investment opportunities, it can over-invest, retain the excess cash, or 
distribute the cash to its shareholders.  Because firms can mitigate agency costs of over-
investment by distributing excess cash to shareholders we predict the following: 
H2a:   Firms that repatriate under the Act abnormally increase shareholder distributions. 
 
Repurchasing stock and paying dividends are the two primary methods for distributing 
excess capital.  However, firms may prefer share repurchases for at least two reasons.  First, 
unlike dividends, open market repurchases do not typically require commitment.  Thus, once a 
firm repurchases, it is not expected to continue to repurchase on a regular basis (Guay and 
Harford 2000).  Second, repurchases are tax-preferred.  Though dividends and repurchases are 
both currently taxed at a 15 percent preferential rate, repurchases are taxed as capital gains, 
which dominate dividends from a tax perspective.18  This leads us to our final hypothesis: 
H2b:  Firms that repatriate under the Act abnormally increase share repurchases. 
 
4. Aggregate Analysis of Repatriations and Shareholder Payouts 
We first analyze the Flow of Funds data published by the Federal Reserve Board to 
document the effect of the Act on aggregate repatriation behavior relative to repatriations before 
                                                 
18 Capital gains dominate dividends from a tax perspective for at least four reasons. One, dividends accelerate the 
tax payment that could be deferred until the stock is sold (or fully avoided if held until the shareholder dies).  Two, 
unlike dividends, shareholders can time the sale of an investment and thus pay the resulting capital gain tax when 
the shareholder’s marginal tax rate is lowest.  Three, with capital gains a portion of the proceeds is treated as a return 
of basis and thus goes untaxed.  Conversely, basis cannot be used to avoid dividend income.  Four, since only 
$3,000 of capital losses (net of capital gains) can be deducted each year, capital gains, unlike dividends, enable 
individuals to accelerate utilization of their pool of capital losses, an important consideration for many individuals 
following the downturn in the equity markets from 2000 to 2002.   
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the Act.  The Flow of Funds data reports total dividends received by U.S. corporations from 
foreign subsidiaries.  If firms increase repatriations during the tax holiday we expect a significant 
increase in dividends received from foreign subsidiaries after the Act.  In Figure 1, we plot total 
dividends received from foreign subsidiaries (i.e., earnings repatriations) for each quarter from 
1989 through 2005.  Total dividends remains within the range of $5 billion to $15 billion for 
most quarters from the first quarter of 1989 through the fourth quarter of 2004, then increases to 
nearly $30 billion in the first quarter of 2005, $35 billion in the second quarter, $74 billion in the 
third quarter, and $65 billion in the fourth quarter.  The mean quarterly dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries is $7.44 billion in 2003 and $8.98 billion in 2004, whereas in 2005 the mean 
quarterly dividends from foreign subsidiaries is $51.28 billion, a 471 percent increase from 2004 
(t=3.79). As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) total dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries is 0.27 percent in 2003, 0.31 percent in 2004, and 1.63 percent in 2005.  Thus, 
repatriations increase by 1.32 percent of GDP during the tax holiday.   
 Because we expect that firms that repatriate under the Act increase total payout, and in 
particular, share repurchases, in Figure 2 we show total quarterly share repurchases and total 
shareholder dividends from 1989 through 2005.19 Both share repurchases and shareholder 
dividends increase steadily from 1995 through 2005.  However, share repurchases begin a 
sharper increase in 2004 that continues through 2005.  The mean quarterly share repurchases 
increases from $11.9 billion in 2003 to $17.1 billion in 2004, a 44 percent increase, and increases 
further to $28.4 billion in 2005, a 66 percent increase.  The mean quarterly shareholder dividends 
                                                 
19 As described in Section 5.3, consistent with Fama and French (2001), we measure net repurchases as the change 
in treasury stock.  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then we set the repurchases measure equal to zero.  For 
those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we estimate share repurchases as repurchases of common and 
preferred stock from the Statement of Cash Flows less the decrease in preferred stock from the Compustat Industrial 
Quarterly files and shareholder dividends as quarterly dividends per share times total shares outstanding from the 
Compustat Industrial Quarterly files.  Consistent with the procedures we use to construct the sample in Section 5, we 
eliminate observations in the top 0.5 percent of dividends and share repurchases. 
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increases from $11.8 billion in 2003 to $13.7 billion in 2004, a 16 percent increase, and increases 
further to $15.3 billion in 2005, a 12 percent increase.  The increase in share repurchases from 
2004 to 2005 is statistically significant (t=4.41), but the increase in dividends is not significant 
(t=1.15).20   
Based on the aggregate data, dividends from foreign subsidiaries increase significantly 
after the Act.  Share repurchases and shareholder dividends also increase significantly after the 
Act.  However aggregate share repurchases and shareholder dividends include amounts for all 
firms regardless of whether they repatriate under the Act.  Therefore, to formally investigate 
repatriation behavior around the Act, we use firm-level data to study characteristics of 
repatriating firms and whether changes in payout behavior differ between firms that repatriate 
under the Act and those that do not repatriate. 
 
5. Firm-Level Analysis of Repatriation Plans and Shareholder Payouts 
To investigate characteristics of repatriating firms and changes in payout behavior for 
repatriating versus non-repatriating firms, we construct a sample using the population of firms on 
Compustat with non-missing world-wide assets (Compustat data6) for 2001 through 2005 and 
non-missing foreign activity for the last three years.21  From this sample, we eliminate firms with 
negative book values, firms incorporated outside of the U.S., and all insurance companies and 
financial services firms.  We then review firms’ FSP 109-2 disclosures about the financial 
statement effects of the Act to study the relation between repatriations under the Act and firms’ 
                                                 
20 At least some portion of the increase in repurchases and dividends in our event period is attributable to the 2003 
reduction in dividends and capital gains tax rates.  However, we document a sharper increase in repurchases that 
corresponds more closely with the timing of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 than the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.  In our multivariate tests, we include a measure of changes in dividend and 
capital gain tax rates to control for the effect of this tax rate change on share repurchases. 
21 We eliminate firms that are missing foreign tax expense or foreign pre-tax earnings on Compustat in each of the 
prior three years.  
 17
payout behavior.22  In the resulting sample of 2,696 firms that mention the Act in their SEC 
reports, 357 repatriate under the Act in 2004 or 2005, and 2,339 state that they will not repatriate 
under the Act or do not mention the tax holiday. 
 
5.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 We report summary statistics by repatriation intentions (repatriating or non-repatriating) 
in Table 1.  Firms in the repatriating sample are larger on average than firms in the non-
repatriating sample in terms of world-wide assets and market value.  At the end of 2004, the 
mean world-wide assets for the repatriating sample is $15.383 billion and the mean market value 
of equity is $14.802 billion, whereas the mean world-wide assets for the non-repatriating sample 
is $2.449 billion and the mean market value of equity is $2.086 billion.  The repatriating sample 
has a lower mean cash to asset ratio (0.177) than the non-repatriating sample (0.228).  The mean 
effective tax rate of the repatriating sample (0.294) is higher than the mean effective tax rate of 
the non-repatriating sample (0.231) suggesting that the repatriating sample faces a greater tax 
burden. For the repatriating sample, the mean amount the firms plan to or have repatriated (Total 
Repatriation) is $833.14 million.  
 Table 2 uses the Fama and French (1997) industry classifications to show the industry 
composition and ratio of cash to assets for repatriating and non-repatriating firms as of the end of 
2004.  Chips represents the greatest industry concentration in the repatriating sample whereas 
Business Services is the largest category in the non-repatriating sample.  We also report the ratio 
of Total Repatriation to Cash (Rep/Cash) for the repatriating firms.  The mean cash to asset ratio 
is 0.18 for repatriating firms and 0.23 for non-repatriating firms. This higher ratio of cash to 
assets for non-repatriating firms suggests that the decision to repatriate is affected by more than 
                                                 
22 See Section 2 for a detailed description of the disclosure requirements. 
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merely having large amounts of cash. Notably, anticipated repatriations reported by repatriating 
firms are more than 1.5 times the cash and short-term securities reported by these firms as of the 
end of 2004.23 
 
5.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF REPATRIATING FIRMS 
 Our theory predicts that the firms that benefit from the Act are those that face costs 
associated with over-investment.  Grullon and Michaely (2004) suggest that agency problems 
attributable to over-investment arise when firms transition from a high-growth to a low-growth 
stage.  As growth opportunities diminish, free cash flows increase, and the likelihood of over-
investment by management increases.  Thus, these firms exhibit decreases in capital investment 
(R&D and capital expenditures) and increases in free cash flows.  In the context of this study, we 
expect that firms that benefit from repatriating under the Act, and therefore decide to repatriate, 
are firms for which growth opportunities in both the U.S. and abroad are decreasing prior to the 
Act.  Therefore, we anticipate that repatriating firms experience decreases in the returns to 
incremental investment, declines in capital investment and growth, and increases in free-cash 
flow in the years leading up to the Act.  To test this prediction, we estimate the following 
equation using logistic regression: 
 Repatriate = α0 + α1ΔFPTI + α2ΔROA + α3ΔMB + α4ΔRD + α5ΔCapEx + α6FCF  
 + α7RateDum + α8USTR+ α9%FAssets (7)  
Where Repatriate equals one if the firm states that it will repatriate (357 firms), and zero 
otherwise (2,339 firms) and each of the change variables (Δ) is the mean of the change in the 
                                                 
23 For illustrative purposes, consider Pfizer.  In its 2005 financial statements, Pfizer disclosed that it planned to 
repatriate $37 billion under the provisions of the Act.  However, its reported total cash and short-term investments 
was $19.893 ($22.226) billion as of the end of 2004 (2005). 
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firm’s measure from 2002 to 2004. 24  ΔROA equals the change in net income scaled by average 
world-wide assets; ΔFPTI equals the change in foreign pre-tax income scaled by average world-
wide assets; ΔMB equals the change in the firm’s market to book value ratio; ΔRD equals the 
change in the ratio of R&D to average world-wide assets; ΔCapEx equals the change in capital 
expenditures divided by average world-wide assets; FCF equals average operating cash flows 
divided by average world-wide assets from 2002 to 2004; RateDum equals one if the U.S. 
statutory rate of 0.35 exceeds the average foreign tax rate from 2002 through 2004, and zero 
otherwise; USTR equals the average U.S. tax rate from 2002 through 2004; %FAssets equals the 
ratio of foreign assets to average world-wide assets.25   
 All variables, with the exception of RateDum, %FAssets, and the numerator in ΔFPTI, 
use world-wide consolidated information.  The use of world-wide consolidated information 
represents a limitation in our data because we are not able, in general, to distinguish changes in 
foreign activity from changes in domestic activity.  However, our theory predicts that investment 
opportunities are limited in both the U.S. and abroad.  Therefore, the consolidated measures test 
the combined effect of foreign and domestic investment opportunities on the probability that a 
firm repatriates under the Act.  As a robustness test, we estimate foreign return on assets and 
domestic return on assets separately for a sub-set of firms in our sample that report foreign 
segment sales, and estimate Equation (7) using these measures in place of ΔFPTI and ΔROA.    
                                                 
24 In calculating the average of the continuous variables from 2002 through 2004, we winsorize firm-year 
observations at the top and bottom 0.5%.   
25 Because few firms report foreign assets in the segment detail, we estimate foreign assets using the method 
described in Oler et al. (2007).  Oler et al. (2007) decompose ROA into the product of the profit margin (Net 
Income/Sales) and the asset turnover ratio (Sales/Assets).  Using foreign segment sales and assuming the asset 
turnover ratio is the same for domestic and foreign operations we can solve for foreign assets.  In our main tests, we 
assume foreign assets equals zero for firms that do not report foreign segment sales.  This allows us to include all of 
our 357 repatriating firms in the analysis.  To control for the possibility that firms that do not report foreign segment 
sales have smaller foreign operations and are therefore less likely to repatriate, we repeat our main tests using only 
firms that report foreign segment sales. 
 20
 H1 predicts that the probability that a firm repatriates under the Act is higher for firms 
with limited investment opportunities in both the U.S. and abroad.  To determine whether a firm 
has limited investment opportunities, we are interested in its incremental investment 
opportunities.  The current period level of earnings as a percentage of assets includes earnings 
from previous, more profitable investments.  However, if returns on incremental investments are 
low, this ratio will be decreasing as the firm makes investments in less profitable opportunities.  
Therefore, we study the change in earnings as a percentage of assets for foreign operations and 
the consolidated entity, ΔFPTI and ΔROA, to test whether firms’ investment opportunities are 
limited.  We expect negative coefficients on both of these variables.26  ΔMB measures changes in 
investors’ expectations about the firm’s investment opportunities.  Because market-to-book 
ratios are increasing in investment opportunities, we expect a negative coefficient on ΔMB.  ΔRD 
and ΔCapEx measure changes in investment activity prior to the Act. We predict negative 
coefficients on these variables because we anticipate that repatriating firms experience decreases 
in investment opportunities in the years leading up to the Act.  As we anticipate that repatriating 
firms have higher free cash flows than non-repatriating firms, we expect a positive coefficient on 
FCF.  We include RateDum and USTR to capture the potential tax benefits of repatriating under 
the Act. Since firms with foreign tax rates greater than the U.S. tax rate generally do not benefit 
from the Act, we predict a positive coefficient on RateDum. USTR captures the firm’s domestic 
tax burden.  We anticipate a positive coefficient on this variable because firms with greater tax 
burdens will likely receive greater tax savings from repatriation under the Act.  Finally, we 
include %FAssets to control for the size of foreign operations relative to the consolidated entity.  
                                                 
26 We deflate foreign earnings by average world-wide assets in our main tests because we would have to set this 
ratio to zero for firms that do not report foreign segment sales introducing a great deal of noise into the measure.  
We test the effect of changes in the ratio of foreign earnings to foreign assets and domestic earnings to domestic 
assets in a sensitivity test.  
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We expect that firms with larger foreign operations are more likely to have funds available to 
repatriate under the Act and therefore expect a positive coefficient on this variable.  
 Table 3 Panel A reports summary statistics for the variables in Equation (7) using the full 
sample of 357 repatriating and 2,339 non-repatriating firms.  Mean repatriations as a percentage 
of world-wide assets is 11.6 percent.27  Consistent with our prediction that repatriating firms 
have lower investment opportunities than non-repatriating firms, the mean ΔFPTI and ΔROA are 
significantly lower for repatriating firms (0.001 and 0.009, respectively) than for non-repatriating 
firms (0.011 and 0.017, respectively).  Likewise, the mean ΔMB is significantly smaller for 
repatriating firms (-0.218) than for non-repatriating firms (0.077).  Also consistent with our 
prediction, FCF is significantly higher for repatriating firms (0.120) than non-repatriating firms 
(0.054).  However, inconsistent with our expectation that repatriating firms face decreasing 
capital investment, ΔRD and ΔCapEx are not significantly smaller for repatriating firms than for 
non-repatriating firms.  The mean ΔRD is -0.001 (-0.000) for repatriating (non-repatriating) 
firms.  The mean ΔCapEx is -0.004 for repatriating firms and -0.003 for non-repatriating firms.   
 Table 3 Panel B reports the univariate statistics for the 336 repatriating and 1,126 non-
repatriating firms that report geographic segment sales.  The only obvious difference between 
Panel A and Panel B is that %FAssets more than doubles for the non-repatriating sample (from 
20.2 percent to 46.2 percent). All other comparisons across repatriating and non-repatriating 
firms are similar to Panel A.  Thus, the results in Table 3 provide preliminary evidence that 
repatriating firms have lower investment opportunities and higher free cash flows than non-
repatriating firms.   
                                                 
27 Seven firms in our sample state that they repatriate under the Act but do not report the amount of repatriation. 
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We report the tests of H1 in Table 4 Panel A.  In Column (1) we report the results of 
estimating Equation (7).  Consistent with our hypothesis that the likelihood that a firm repatriates 
under the Act is higher for firms with limited investment opportunities, the coefficients on 
ΔFPTI and ΔROA are negative and significant.  Also consistent with H1, the coefficient on ΔMB 
is negative and significant. Because the market to book ratio represents investors’ expectations 
about the future earnings of the firm, this result suggests that the likelihood of repatriation 
increases when the market anticipates declining investment opportunities.  The coefficient on 
FCF is positive and significant consistent with H1 suggesting that the probability of repatriation 
is increasing in free cash flows.  However, the coefficients on ΔRD and ΔCapEx are 
insignificant, inconsistent with H1.  The coefficient on %FAssets is positive and significant, 
consistent with larger foreign operations yielding more earnings to repatriate.   
In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, we estimate Equation (7) using a Tobit analysis with 
Total Repatriation divided by world-wide assets and Total Repatriation divided by lagged PRE 
as the dependent variables, respectively.  The results are similar to those in Column (1) and 
suggest that the amount that firms repatriate under the Act is increasing in their over-investment 
concerns.28 
 To further ensure that our results are not driven by differences in the size of foreign 
operations, in Table 4 Panel B we estimate Equation (7) using only firms that report foreign 
segment sales.  This data screen results in a sample of 1,462 firms with 336 repatriating firms 
and 1,126 non-repatriating firms.  Results are consistent with those in Panel A.  In Panel A, we 
                                                 
28 When we include the level of FPTI (scaled by world-wide assets) as a control for the size of foreign operations, 
inferences are unchanged.  Results are also similar when we include world-wide assets as a control for size as in 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) and when we include the market-to-book ratio.  However, in each of these tests, the 
coefficient on ΔMB becomes insignificant. In addition, results are similar when we replace USTR and RateDum with 
TaxBurden, defined as (max{U.S. taxes on foreign earnings (data273*0.35 less foreign taxes already paid(data64)), 
zero}), from Foley et al. (2007).  Results are also not sensitive to including controls for the firm’s industry. 
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include ΔFPTI, foreign pre-tax income divided by world-wide assets, to test whether firms with 
decreasing returns are more likely to repatriate.  Because we deflate by world-wide assets, this 
variable is a potentially noisy measure of the foreign return on assets.  For the sample used in 
Panel B, we can calculate foreign and domestic assets for 1,372 observations.  In Column (3) we 
replace ΔFPTI and ΔROA with ΔFROA (the change in foreign return on assets) and ΔUSROA 
(the change in domestic return on assets).  Consistent with H1, the coefficients on each of these 
variables are negative and significant suggesting that firms with limited investment opportunities 
in both the U.S. and abroad, measured as decreasing returns to domestic and foreign investment, 
are more likely to repatriate during the tax holiday.  Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the probability of repatriation under the Act is increasing in 
firms’ over-investment concerns.  Next, we investigate whether repatriating firms attempt to 
mitigate this agency cost by distributing repatriated funds. 
 
5.3. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN PAYOUT BEHAVIOR 
In Tables 5 and 6 we compare quarterly share repurchases and shareholder dividends for 
the repatriating and non-repatriating samples.  Table 5 reports the mean ratio of share 
repurchases to world-wide assets (ShrRep) and the total dollar amount of repurchases (Total 
Repurchases) by quarter beginning with the first quarter of 2003 through the fourth quarter of 
2005 for the two sub-samples.  Consistent with Fama and French (2001), we measure net 
repurchases as the change in treasury stock.  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then we 
set repurchases equal to zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we 
measure net repurchases as total repurchases from the statement of cash flows less decreases in 
preferred stock.   
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The repatriating sample has larger ShrRep than the non-repatriating sample.  For the 
repatriating sample, ShrRep increases from 2.28 percent of assets in 2003, to 2.96 percent of 
assets in 2004, and 4.32 percent of assets in 2005, an increase in total repurchases of 2.04 percent 
of assets from 2003 to 2005.  For firms in the non-repatriating sample, ShrRep increases from 
0.97 percent of assets in 2003 to 1.35 percent of assets in 2004 and 1.75 percent of assets in 
2005, an increase in share repurchases of 0.78 percent of assets from 2003 to 2005.  This 
increase in repurchase activity for repatriating firms is consistent with an increase in payout 
behavior for firms planning to repatriate under the Act.   
 We investigate the dividend behavior of firms in the repatriating and non-repatriating 
samples in order to determine whether all payouts to shareholders generally increase over the 
period.  In Table 6 we report the mean ratio of dividends to world-wide assets (Dividends) and 
Total Dividends for each sub-sample. We estimate dividends as quarterly dividends per share 
times the number of shares outstanding from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly files.  Increases 
in dividends are more modest than the increases in repurchases. For the repatriating sample, 
Dividends increases from 1.29 percent of assets in 2003, to 1.61 percent of assets in 2004, and 
then decreases to 1.57 percent of assets in 2005, an increase in dividends of 0.28 percent of 
assets from 2003 to 2005.  For the non-repatriating sample, Dividends increases from 1.51 
percent of assets in 2003 to 1.63 percent of assets in 2004 and 2.11 percent of assets in 2005, an 
increase in total dividends of 0.60 percent of assets. Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest 
that repatriating firms increase repurchases relative to non-repatriating firms but do not 
systematically increase dividends after the Act. 
 
5.4. MULTIVARIATE TESTS OF CHANGES IN PAYOUT BEHAVIOR 
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 We formally test whether changes in payout behavior are related to repatriations under 
the Act using the following empirical model29: 
 ΔPayouti,t = β0 + β1PostActi,t + β2Repatriatei,t + β3PostAct*Repatriatei,t  
+ β4Sizei,t-1 + β5ΔCapExi,t-1 + β6ΔROAi,t + β7ROAi,t + β8Debti,t-1  + β9DivYldi,t-1  
+ β10ΔCashi,t-1 + β11ΔPenaltyt + β12ΔPayouti,t-4 + γkIndustryi,k + θqQtri,q + ei  (8) 
Where ΔPayout equals the change in total dividends plus net share repurchases divided by 
world-wide assets from quarter t-4 to quarter t; PostAct is a dummy variable equal to one for all 
quarters beginning after the Act (i.e., the four quarters during 2005) and zero otherwise; 
Repatriate is a dummy variable equal to one for firms that state that they will repatriate under the 
Act, and zero otherwise; Size equals the log of market value of equity at the beginning of the 
quarter; ΔCapEx equals the change in the ratio of capital expenditures to world-wide assets from 
the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t; ΔROA equals the change in the ratio of 
earnings to average world-wide assets from quarter t-1 to quarter t; ROA equals the ratio of 
annualized earnings to average world-wide assets in the current quarter.  Debt equals the ratio of 
current plus long term debt to world-wide assets as of the beginning of the quarter; DivYld equals 
dividends per share divided by stock price at the end of the quarter; ΔCash equals the change in 
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to world-wide assets from the beginning of quarter t-4 to 
the beginning of quarter t; ΔPenalty equals the change in the dividend tax penalty from quarter t-
4 to quarter t; the dividend tax penalty equals the dividend tax rate minus the capital gain tax rate 
divided by one minus the capital gain tax rate from Poterba and Summers (1985); and Industry 
and Qtr are fixed effects.  
                                                 
29 Core, Guay, Richardson, and Verdi (2006) and Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) use similar models to predict 
repurchase behavior. 
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The coefficient on PostAct measures whether changes in payout increase after the Act, 
and the coefficient on Repatriate measures whether changes are higher for repatriating firms than 
non-repatriating firms.  We make no prediction for these coefficients.  However, H2a predicts that 
repatriating firms increase payout more than non-repatriating firms after the Act. Therefore, we 
expect a positive coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate (β3).   
H2b predicts that because share repurchases, unlike dividend payments, do not require a 
commitment to make ongoing distributions, firms will prefer share repurchases to dividend 
payments as a means of distributing repatriated funds to shareholders.  Thus, we expect that 
repatriating firms’ share repurchases increase more than dividend payments after the Act.  To 
test H2b, we estimate Equation (8) using ΔShrRep, the change in the ratio of share repurchases to 
world-wide assets from quarter t-4 to quarter t, and ΔDividends, the change in the ratio of 
dividends to world-wide assets from quarter t-4 to quarter t, in turn as the dependent variable.  
We expect a positive coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate when ΔShrRep is the dependent variable.   
Furthermore, we anticipate that β3 is lower in magnitude when ΔDividends is the dependent 
variable relative to when ΔShrRep is the dependent variable. 
We also include variables that existing research finds to be significant determinants of 
repurchases and dividends.  Dittmar (2000) predicts that firms are more likely to repurchase 
shares when the stock is undervalued and information asymmetry is high.  Because Vermaelen 
(1981) predicts that information asymmetry between managers and investors is higher for small 
firms, Dittmar (2000) predicts that repurchases are decreasing in firm size.  However, Dittmar 
(2000) and Core, Guay, Richardson, and Verdi (2006) find a positive relation between 
repurchases and size, and Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) find a positive relation between 
dividends and size.  We expect a positive coefficient on Size because existing empirical evidence 
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suggests that large firms tend to make larger repurchases and pay more dividends.  Existing 
studies show that dividends and repurchases are increasing in profitability (Lintner 1956, Skinner 
2008).  To control for this effect, we include ΔROA and ROA.  We expect a positive coefficient 
on ROA but make no prediction for the coefficient on ΔROA. Consistent with Dittmar (2000) and 
Core et al. (2006) we expect Debt and ΔCapEx to be negatively related to repurchases.  Because 
we anticipate that shareholder payouts are increasing in the cash available for repurchases and 
dividends, we expect a positive coefficient on ΔCash.  In addition, we include DivYld as a 
measure of a firm’s capacity to increase dividends.  Firms with higher dividend yield have less 
ability to increase dividends.  DivYld also controls for the substitutability of dividends and 
repurchases (Grullon and Michaely 2002).  We make no prediction for the coefficient on DivYld 
when ΔPayout or ΔShrRep is the dependent variable because it is unclear whether dividends are 
a substitute or complement for repurchases.  However, we expect DivYld to be negatively related 
to ΔDividends.  ΔPenalty controls for the effect of dividend and capital gain tax rates on 
dividends and share repurchases.  We expect the dividend tax penalty to be positively related to 
share repurchases and negatively related to dividends.  Finally, the lagged values of changes in 
the payout measures control for changes in payout levels before the Act, and we expect negative 
coefficients on these variables. 
 Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics by quarter for our sample of 2,696 firms.  The 
mean log of market value of equity for this sample (Size) ranges from 5.652 to 5.681 across the 
four quarters.  The mean change in repurchases as a percent of assets ranges from 0.027 percent 
to 0.037 percent and the mean change in dividends as a percent of assets ranges from 0.001 to 
0.004 percent. 
 Table 8 includes the results from estimating Equation (8), the OLS estimation of the 
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relation between repatriation plans and changes in payout behavior.  In Panel A, we report the 
results using Compustat estimates of ΔPayout, ΔDividends, and ΔShrRep.30  In Column (1), 
where ΔPayout is the dependent variable, the coefficient on PostAct is positive and significant, 
indicating that payout levels generally increase during 2005 consistent with Figure 2.  The 
coefficient on Repatriate is negative and significant, indicating that repatriating firms have 
significantly lower changes in payout before the Act than non-repatriating firms.  Consistent with 
H2a, the coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate is positive and significant (β3=0.00281; t=4.44).  This 
result is consistent with our expectation that firms that repatriate under the Act have larger 
increases in payout after the Act than firms that do not repatriate.  
In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 we decompose ΔPayout into changes in dividends and 
changes in share repurchases.  In Column (2) we report the results using changes in dividends, 
ΔDividends, as the dependent variable.  As in Column (1), the coefficient on PostAct is positive 
and significant, and the coefficient on Repatriate is negative but insignificant.  The positive and 
insignificant coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate (β3=0.00004; t=0.27) suggests that firms that 
repatriate under the Act do not significantly change their dividend policy around the Act.   
When ΔShrRep is the dependent variable (Column (3)), the coefficient on PostAct is 
positive and significant and the coefficient on Repatriate is negative and significant.  The 
positive and significant coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate (β3=0.00277; t=4.28) is consistent 
with H2b.31  This result suggests that firms that repatriate under the Act increase share 
repurchases after the Act by 0.277 percent of world-wide assets more per quarter during 2005 
                                                 
30 All t-statistics are calculated using the Newey-West procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.  Results are similar when we calculate standard errors clustered by firm or time. 
31 In additional tests we include measures of stock option exercises to control for the possibility that firms 
repurchase shares to offset the dilutive effect of option exercises (Dittmar 2000).  The coefficient on the stock option 
measure is not significant and including this variable does not affect inferences related to the variables of interest.  
We also include the market to book ratio as an additional control and find similar results.  Results are also similar if 
we replace ΔCash with FCF as defined in Table 3. 
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than non-repatriating firms.  We also estimate Equation (8) using the ratio of the amount 
repatriated to world-wide assets in place of Repatriate and report the results in Column (4) of 
Table 8.  We find that the increase in repurchases for repatriating firms after the Act is positively 
related to the amount the firm plans to repatriate.32  Overall, the results suggest that repatriating 
firms increase payout to shareholders after the Act by a larger amount than non-repatriating 
firms, and the increase in payout results from an increase in share repurchases. 
To determine the economic significance of the effect of the Act on share repurchases, we 
multiply the coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate in Column (3) of Table 8 Panel A (0.00277) by 
the world-wide assets of the 357 firms that state that they plan to repatriate ($5.492 trillion) 
yielding the mean increase in repurchases per quarter for the four quarters of 2005.  This 
estimate suggests that repatriating firms increase net repurchases in 2005 by $60.85 billion more 
than non-repatriating firms [(0.00277*$5,492*4)].  This figure represents 20.87 percent of the 
total maximum amount of repatriations reported by the sample firms ($291.6 billion).  However, 
we use only four quarters after the Act to estimate the coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate.  Most 
firms have not yet completed spending the repatriated funds by the end of 2005.33  Therefore, 
this estimate is likely understated. 
The results for the control variables in Table 8 are mixed.  Consistent with our 
expectations and existing literature, the coefficient on Size is positive and significant when 
ΔPayout or ΔShrRep is the dependent variable, but is negative and significant when ΔDividends 
is the dependent variable.  The coefficient on ΔCapEx is negative as predicted, but is not 
significant.  Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient on Debt is negative and significant 
                                                 
32 Seven firms in our sample state that they repatriated under the Act, but do not provide an amount. When we 
eliminate these firms, the coefficient on PostAct*MaxRep is 0.0194. 
33 Redmiles (2008) suggests that 50% (70%) of the firms repatriating will have completed their investment of the 
repatriated funds by the end of 2006 (2007).  
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and the coefficient on ΔCash is positive and significant for all payout measures. However, this 
finding is different from the results in Core et al. (2006) who find no significant relation between 
repurchases and cash holdings.  The coefficient on ΔROA is negative and significant and the 
coefficient on ROA is positive and significant for all payout measures. The coefficient on DivYld 
is negative and significant when ΔPayout or ΔShrRep is the dependent variable, consistent with a 
substitution effect.  The coefficient on ΔPenalty is negative and significant when ΔDividends is 
the dependent variable and positive and significant when ΔShrRep is the dependent variable, 
consistent with firms paying out more repurchases and less dividends when dividends are taxed 
at a higher rate relative to capital gains. 
In Panel B of Table 8, we re-estimate Equation (8) using CRSP measures of ΔPayout, 
ΔDividends, and ΔShrRep as the dependent variable.34  The results in Panel B are also consistent 
with our hypotheses.  The coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate is positive and significant for 
ΔPayout (β3=0.00267; t=3.93) and for ΔShrRep (β3=0.00254; t=4.23) suggesting that repatriating 
firms increase repurchases after the Act by 0.254 percent of world-wide assets ($55.80 billion) 
more than non-repatriating firms.  Thus, we estimate that 19.14 percent of the total repatriations 
reported by the sample firms [(0.00254*$5,492*4)/$291.6] are distributed as repurchases.  Also 
consistent with the results in Panel A, when ΔDividends is the dependent variable, the coefficient 
on PostAct*Repatriate is not significant (β3=0.00017; t=1.21), consistent with the prediction that 
firms increase share repurchases after the Act but do not significantly change their dividend 
policy. 
 
                                                 
34 We estimate ΔShrRep using CRSP data by multiplying monthly decreases in shares outstanding by the end of the 
month stock price.  We make corrections as described in Pontiff and Woodgate (2005) to eliminate repurchases 
attributable to errors in the CRSP data. 
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5.5 SENSITIVITY TESTS  
Because the dependent variable of interest in our model, Repatriate, is a choice variable, 
our results potentially suffer from self-selection bias.  Specifically, large, stable, profitable firms 
are more likely to repurchase shares because they have more free cash flow.  These firms are also 
more likely to have large foreign operations and therefore more likely to repatriate under the Act.  
Our empirical specification uses a difference in differences approach which should mitigate this 
potential bias: The main effect for Repatriate controls for whether firms that repatriate have 
larger changes in repurchases over time, and PostAct*Repatriate tests whether, after controlling 
for other determinants of repurchases, repatriating firms have larger changes in repurchases after 
the Act than non-repatriating firms.   
To further control for potential self-selection bias, we use a two step estimation procedure 
(Heckman 1979). We first estimate Equation (7) using a Probit regression.  Because we use this 
procedure to correct for the possibility that large, profitable firms are both more likely to 
repatriate and more likely to repurchase shares, we also include world-wide assets, the average 
foreign pre-tax earnings divided by world-wide assets from 2001 to 2004, and the average 
consolidated return on assets from 2001 through 2004 in the probit equation.  From this 
estimation we calculate the inverse Mills ratio and add it as an additional variable in Equation 
(8).  Because we only observe the repatriation decision in 2005, we estimate Equation (8) using 
annual data for 2005.  
We report the results of this two step procedure in Table 9.  In this specification, the 
coefficient on Repatriate in Panel B tests whether firms that repatriate under the Act have larger 
changes in repurchases from 2004 to 2005 than non-repatriating firms.  After correcting standard 
errors for correlation in errors between the two equations (Maddala 1983), we find that the 
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coefficient on Repatriate is 0.00978 (z=2.15). This result suggests that 18.4 percent of the total 
amount of repatriations reported by the sample firms are distributed as repurchases 
[(0.00978*5,492)/291.6].  Thus, we find similar results after correcting for self-selection bias. 
Another alternative explanation for our results stems from Skinner’s (2008) finding that, 
over time, share repurchases are both increasing and replacing dividends as a method of paying 
out corporate cash to shareholders.  He also finds that more profitable firms make larger payouts 
to shareholders.  These empirical observations suggest that our results can be explained by firms 
merely increasing their payout in conjunction with earnings increases.  We control for this issue 
in our primary model by including Size, ΔROA, and ROA.   However, to further test whether our 
results can be explained by earnings changes, we calculate abnormal share repurchases based on 
a firm-specific payout ratio.  We calculate the firm-specific payout ratio by estimating the 
following relation by firm using years t-5 through t-1: 
ΔPayoutt = γ0 + γ1ROAt + γ2Payoutt-1 + ηt, (9) 
where all variables are defined as in Equation (8) (Lintner 1956).  We calculate abnormal 
changes in payout as the current-year change in payout minus the predicted value from Equation 
(9).  We repeat the same process using share repurchases to estimate abnormal changes in share 
repurchases. By using only the previous five years to estimate target payout ratios, we control for 
increases in share repurchases over time.  By estimating firm-specific target payout ratios, we 
control for the possibility that increases in profitability explain our results.   
 We report the results using abnormal changes in share repurchases and abnormal changes 
in payout as the dependent variable in Table 10 Columns (1) and (2).  In both columns, the 
coefficient on PostAct*Repatriate is positive and significant.  In Column (1), the coefficient on 
PostAct*Repatriate using abnormal changes in share repurchases as the dependent variable is 
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0.00219 which suggests that 16.5 percent of the total amount of repatriations reported by the 
sample firms are distributed as repurchases [(0.00219*$5,492*4)/$291.6].  Thus, we find similar 
results after controlling for increases in repurchases over time and firm-specific target payout 
ratios.  In untabulated results, we estimate abnormal changes in repurchases and payout using the 
full sample period (1989 through 2005) to estimate firm-specific target payout ratios and find 
similar results. 
We perform additional tests to determine the sensitivity of the results to the sample 
composition.  Because the dependent variables, ΔPayout, ΔDividends, and ΔShrRep, include a 
large proportion of zeros, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to omitting observations 
that do not pay dividends or make share repurchases.  We report the results of estimating 
Equation (8) without observations with a value of zero for ΔShrRep in Table 10 Column (3). The 
results are consistent with our hypotheses, and the magnitude of the coefficient on 
PostAct*Repatriate is similar to that reported in Table 8 (β3 = 0.00254; t=2.26).  To determine 
whether our results are driven by the inclusion of firms with small amounts of foreign activity, in 
Column (4) of Table 10 we report the results of estimating Equation (8) using only the 1,462 
firms that report foreign segment sales.  Once again, results are consistent with those reported in 
Table 8 (β3 = 0.00229; t = 3.26).35 
 
5.6. OTHER USES OF THE REPATRIATED FUNDS 
The results in Table 8 suggest that increases in repurchases account for only 20.87 
percent of the $292 billion that firms repatriate under the Act.  To investigate other possible uses 
                                                 
35 We also investigate whether our results are affected by changes in the sample over time by estimating Equation 
(8) for a balanced panel of firms with data available for each quarter from 1989 through 2005.  Results are similar to 
those reported in Table 8. 
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of the repatriated funds, we examine the statement of cash flows of repatriating firms to identify 
how repatriated earnings are spent in 2005.  If the entire $291.6 billion represents cash abroad 
that is repatriated to the U.S. and then spent during 2005, we would expect to see a surge in the 
net cash outflow of repatriating firms resulting in lower levels of cash.  However, untabulated 
data indicate that cash balances of repatriating firms increase between 2004 and 2005 ($818.4 
billion and $941.4 billion, respectively).  One explanation for this increase is that firms could 
have converted foreign assets to cash for repatriation, but have not yet invested the remitted cash. 
Another is that firms borrowed abroad to repatriate earnings but have not yet invested the cash.  
Finally, higher levels of cash could be indicative of an increase in cash flows from operations.  
To further explore how firms use repatriated funds, we examine payments by repatriating 
firms for both allowed and disallowed uses of repatriated funds.  Figure 3 illustrates cash inflows 
and outflows on the firms’ statements of cash flows including payments for repurchases, 
dividends, acquisitions, investments, debt, property plant and equipment, currency translation 
adjustments, R&D, and pension assets.  Payments for acquisitions and R&D, allowed uses of 
repatriated funds, decrease insignificantly during 2005, whereas payments for capital 
expenditures (allowed) and dividends (disallowed) increase during 2005, but by insignificant 
amounts.  Debt issuances and currency translation adjustments significantly increase during 2005 
but neither of these items represents significant uses of cash.   Therefore, Figure 3 implies that, 
of all the possible uses of funds that we identify, only repurchases increase by a significant 
amount in 2005.  Further, the results in Table 8 suggest that, of the total $80 billion increase in 
repurchases from 2004 to 2005, 75 percent ($60 billion) is attributable to the Act.36  
                                                 
36 Our findings are also consistent with repatriating firms continuing to hold their repatriated funds in reserve for 
spending in future periods.  However, our review of the spending during 2006 does not provide evidence that 
investment spending has increased. 
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However, the results in Figure 3 must be interpreted with caution.  We can only observe 
net cash flows at the consolidated level.  If, for example, a firm repatriates under the Act and 
intends to use the remitted funds towards domestic rather than foreign R&D, the net R&D at the 
consolidated level would show no change.  Note that share repurchases do not suffer from this 
limitation. To the extent that consolidated data suggest that repatriating firms use the funds to 
repurchase shares, repatriated earnings are not used for the activities listed by Congress and 
Treasury as approved uses.  
   
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
 On October 22, 2004 Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act that provides a 
one-time 85 percent dividends received deduction on dividends received by U.S. multinational 
corporations from their foreign subsidiaries.  The purpose of the Act is to encourage 
multinational firms to bring funds currently held in foreign subsidiaries back to the U.S. and use 
those funds to increase jobs and capital investment.  However, our theory suggests that firms 
likely to repatriate under the Act are those with limited investment opportunities in both the U.S. 
and abroad. Therefore, under the assumptions of constant and exogenous tax rates, after-tax 
returns, and cost of capital, the optimal use of repatriated funds is to make shareholder 
distributions.  Consistent with this prediction, we find that the likelihood that firms repatriate 
under the Act is decreasing in changes in return on assets and market to book ratios in the years 
preceding the Act, and increasing in free cash flows.  Further, we find evidence that firms 
repatriating under the Act increase repurchases after the Act relative to non-repatriating firms but 
do not significantly increase dividend payments.  Finally, we do not find evidence that spending 
on R&D, acquisitions, or property plant and equipment significantly increase during the period 
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subsequent to the Act. However, this result is subject to the limitation that we can only observe 
cash outflows for these purposes on a world-wide basis.
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FIGURE 1 
Net Quarterly Dividends from Foreign Subsidiaries 
This figure graphs net quarterly dividends received by U.S. multinational corporations from foreign subsidiaries 
using the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds data.  Amounts are the sum of net dividends received from foreign 
subsidiaries for each quarter from the first quarter of 1989 through the fourth quarter of 2005.  Values on the y-axis 
are in $ millions.   
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FIGURE 2 
Total Quarterly Share Repurchases and Shareholder Dividends 
This figure graphs total share repurchases and total shareholder dividends paid by sample firms from the first quarter 
of 1989 through the fourth quarter of 2005.  The sample includes firms listed on Compustat, incorporated in the U.S. 
that have non missing foreign activity in at least one of the previous three years, excluding insurance companies and 
financial services firms and observations in the top 0.5 percent of the sample.  Total Share Repurchases equals the 
sum of repurchases for sample firms for the quarter where repurchases equals the change in treasury stock (data226).  
If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases equals zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury 
stock method, we estimate repurchases as repurchases of common and preferred stock from the Statement of Cash 
Flows less the decrease in preferred stock from the Compustat Industrial Quarterly files (data93 less the change in 
data51 and the change in data71).  Total Shareholder Dividends equals total dividends paid by sample firms during 
the quarter where dividends equals dividends per share times the number of shares outstanding from the Compustat 
Industrial Quarterly files.  Values on the y-axis are in $ millions.   
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000
19
89
Q
1
19
90
Q
1
19
91
Q
1
19
92
Q
1
19
93
Q
1
19
94
Q
1
19
95
Q
1
19
96
Q
1
19
97
Q
1
19
98
Q
1
19
99
Q
1
20
00
Q
1
20
01
Q
1
20
02
Q
1
20
03
Q
1
20
04
Q
1
20
05
Q
1
Total Shareholder Dividends Total Share Repurchases
 
 
 42
FIGURE 3 
Changes in Cash Outflows for Repatriating Firms 
Figure 3 reports changes in cash outflows for 357 firms that repatriate under the Act.  Dividends are cash dividends as reported on the statement of cash flows 
(data127).  Repurchases are purchases of common and preferred stock (data115).  Acquisitions are as reported on the statement of cash flows (data129).  Net 
Capex represents net capital expenditures defined as purchases of property, plant, and equipment less proceeds from the sale of property, plant, and equipment 
(data128 – data107).  RD is research development defined as R&D plus advertising expenditures (data45 + data46).  Net Chg in Pension represents the net 
change in net pension assets (data287 – data286 – (lagged data287 – lagged data286)).  Net Investments represents purchases of marketable securities, 
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and other long-term investments less sales of these items (data113 – data109).  Net ST Investments represents 
purchases of short-term marketable securities and other short-term investments less sales of these items (-data309).  Misc Investments are net other cash inflows 
and outflows found in the investing section of the statement of cash flows (-data310).  Net LTD is payments of long-term debt net of issuances (data114 – 
data111).  Net Current Debt is payments of short-term debt net of issuances (-data301).  Stock Issuances are sales and issuances of common and preferred stock  
(-data108).  Misc Financing is net other cash inflows and outflows found in the financing section of the statement of cash flows (-data312).  FX Effects are the 
exchange rate effects on cash balances as reported on the statement of cash flows (-data314).  Total Investment is the sum of Net Capex, Acquisitions, RD and 
Misc Investments.  Amounts are scaled by world-wide assets (data6). 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Lexis-Nexis Sample and the Compustat Sample 
This table reports annual means and medians of descriptive data as of the end of 2004 for the samples of 
repatriating and non-repatriating firms.  We include all firms with Compustat data available for the period 2001 to 
2005, excluding firms with negative book values, firms incorporated outside the U.S, insurance companies, 
financial services firms, and firms with missing foreign activity in each of the last three years.  Repatriating firms 
are those that state that they will repatriate under the Act.  Non-repatriating firms those that either state that they 
will not repatriate under the Act or do not mention the tax holiday in their financial statements.  Assets equals 
world-wide assets (data6).  MVE is price per share (data199) times common shares outstanding in millions 
(data25).  Debt is the ratio of long-term debt (data9) plus the debt included in current liabilities (data34) to world-
wide assets (data6).  Cash is cash and marketable securities (data1) scaled by world-wide assets (data6).  MB is the 
ratio of the market value to book value ((data25*data199)/data60).  ROA is net income (data172) scaled by world-
wide assets (data6).  FPTI is the ratio of foreign pre-tax income (data273) to world-wide assets (data6).  ETR is the 
total effective tax rate measured as total tax expense (data16) over pre-tax income (data170).  USTR, the U.S. 
effective tax rate, is domestic tax expense (data63) over domestic pre-tax income (data272).  FTR is the foreign 
effective tax rate calculated as foreign tax expense (data64) over foreign pre-tax income (data273).  PRE is the 
amount of permanently reinvested foreign subsidiary earnings reported in the income tax footnote.  Total 
Repatriation is the amount the firm reports that it has or plans to repatriate under the provisions of the Act in its 
2004 or 2005 10-K.  Dollar amounts are in $ millions. 
Variable  Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
  N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Assets  357 15,382.55 2,486.74  2,339 2,449.38 280.95 
MVE  357 14,801.79 3,395.84  2,339 2,085.55 337.80 
Debt  357 0.216 0.202  2,339 0.197 0.141 
Cash  357 0.177 0.117  2,339 0.228 0.131 
MB  357 3.538 2.811  2,339 2.948 2.200 
ROA  357 0.070 0.066  2,339 0.011 0.039 
FPTI  357 0.042 0.030  2,339 0.006 0.000 
ETR  357 0.294 0.302  2,339 0.231 0.290 
USTR  357 0.184 0.101  2,339 0.052 0.000 
FTR  357 0.220 0.207  2,339 0.081 0.000 
PRE  280 1,136.78 153.15  N/A N/A N/A 
Total 
Repatriation 
 350 833.14 152.50  N/A N/A N/A 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Composition by Industry 
This table provides the sample industry composition (Fama and Frech 1997) by repatriation status. Repatriating 
firms include firms that state that they will repatriate under the Act.  Non-repatriating firms include firms that either 
state that they will not repatriate under the Act or do not mention the tax holiday in their financial statements.  See 
Table 1 for additional sample selection criteria.  Cash is total cash (data1) scaled by assets (data6).  Rep/Cash is the 
amount the firm reports that it has or plans to repatriate scaled by total cash (data1). 
Fama French  Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
Industries N % Cash Rep/Cash  N % Cash 
Agriculture 0 N/A N/A N/A  10 0.43% 0.19 
Food  10 2.80% 0.08 1.7  34 1.45% 0.11 
Soda 1 0.28% 0.01 10.32  5 0.21% 0.08 
Beer 4 1.12% 0.12 2.36  7 0.30% 0.15 
Smoke 2 0.56% 0.11 0.54  1 0.04% 0.12 
Toys 5 1.40% 0.22 1.19  17 0.73% 0.16 
Fun 1 0.28% 0.04 0.19  35 1.50% 0.15 
Books 1 0.28% 0.12 0.31  26 1.11% 0.15 
Household 12 3.36% 0.09 2.08  29 1.24% 0.15 
Clothes 10 2.80% 0.21 0.73  37 1.58% 0.14 
Health 9 2.52% 0.14 0.57  119 5.09% 0.24 
Med Eq 17 4.76% 0.2 1.07  85 3.63% 0.28 
Drugs 25 7.00% 0.23 1.14  147 6.28% 0.56 
Chemicals 20 5.60% 0.05 4.34  30 1.28% 0.15 
Rubber 5 1.40% 0.07 1.44  15 0.64% 0.06 
Textiles 3 0.84% 0.05 1.09  9 0.38% 0.15 
Bldg Mat 10 2.80% 0.07 0.63  43 1.84% 0.16 
Construction 1 0.28% 0.03 0.29  38 1.62% 0.14 
Steel 7 1.96% 0.07 2.48  30 1.28% 0.06 
Fab Pr 0 N/A N/A N/A  7 0.30% 0.04 
Machinery 19 5.32% 0.11 1.75  81 3.46% 0.18 
Electrical Eq 8 2.24% 0.14 0.99  41 1.75% 0.20 
Misc 4 1.12% 0.04 0.7  14 0.60% 0.36 
Autos 10 2.80% 0.1 1.49  26 1.11% 0.13 
Aero 7 1.96% 0.07 0.68  10 0.43% 0.06 
Ships 0 N/A N/A N/A  7 0.30% 0.14 
Defense 0 N/A N/A N/A  5 0.21% 0.10 
Gold 0 N/A N/A N/A  4 0.17% 0.15 
Mines 1 0.28% 0.06 0.94  6 0.26% 0.16 
Coal 0 N/A N/A N/A  2 0.09% 0.08 
Energy 16 4.48% 0.09 4.88  80 3.42% 0.12 
Utilities 1 0.28% 0.02 1.12  33 1.41% 0.04 
Telecom 2 0.56% 0.03 0.24  65 2.78% 0.17 
Personal Svcs 1 0.28% 0.26 0.13  15 0.64% 0.07 
Business Svcs 31 8.68% 0.35 0.56  267 11.42% 0.34 
Computers 18 5.04% 0.36 0.41  102 4.36% 0.40 
Chips 34 9.52% 0.32 0.48  176 7.52% 0.36 
Lab Eq 13 3.64% 0.18 1.38  75 3.21% 0.30 
Paper 10 2.80% 0.07 9.62  24 1.03% 0.08 
Boxes 4 1.12% 0.04 1.27  4 0.17% 0.04 
Transport 2 0.56% 0.28 0.57  67 2.86% 0.11 
Wholesale 7 1.96% 0.06 0.43  98 4.19% 0.11 
Retail 17 4.76% 0.19 0.53  147 6.28% 0.13 
Meals 3 0.84% 0.04 2.48  54 2.31% 0.10 
Real Estate 0 N/A N/A N/A  20 0.86% 0.13 
Fin 6 1.68% 0.27 2.68  192 8.21% 0.14 
Total 357  0.18 1.66  2339  0.23 
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Table 3 
Incentives to Repatriate 
Total Repatriation/Assets is the ratio of the amount the firm reports that it has repatriated or plans to repatriate in $ millions to world-wide assets (data6).  Each of 
the change variables (Δ) is the mean of the change in the firm’s measure over the three-year period 2002 to 2004.  ΔFPTI equals the change in foreign pre-tax 
income (data273) scaled by world-wide assets (data6); ΔROA is the change in net income (data172) scaled by world-wide assets (data6); ΔMB equals the change 
in the firm’s market to book value ratio ((data25*data199)/data60); ΔRD equals the change in the ratio of R&D to world-wide assets; ΔCapEx equals the change 
in capital expenditures (data128) divided by world-wide assets; FCF equals average operating cash flows (data308) divided by world-wide assets for the period 
2002 to 2004; RateDum equals one if the U.S tax rate of 0.35 exceeds the average foreign tax rate (data64/data273) from 2002 through 2004, and zero otherwise; 
and USTR equals the average U.S. tax rate (data63/data272) from 2002 through 2004.  %FAssets is the ratio of FAssets (foreign assets estimated as described in 
Oler et al. (2007)) to world-wide assets (data6).  ΔFROA is the change in foreign ROA where FROA is estimated using the process described in Oler et al (2007).  
ΔUSROA is change in domestic ROA where USROA is ROA less FROA.  Repatriating firms include firms that state that they will repatriate under the Act.  Non-
repatriating firms include firms that either state that they will not repatriate under the Act or do not mention the tax holiday in their financial statements.  The 
sample in Panel A includes the 2,696 firms described in Table 1.  The sample in Panel B is only firms with non-missing foreign segment sales information.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percent.  ***, **, * indicates significantly different from the repatriating sample at the 1 percent, 5 
percent and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
 Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Total Repatriation/Assets 350 0.116 0.076  2,339 N/A*** N/A 
ΔFPTI 357 0.001 0.000  2,339 0.011** 0.000 
ΔROA 357 0.009 0.006  2,339 0.017** 0.004 
ΔMB 357 -0.218 -0.011  2,339 0.077*** 0.101 
ΔRD 357 -0.001 0.000  2,339 -0.000 0.000 
ΔCapEx 357 -0.004 -0.002  2,339 -0.003 0.000 
FCF 357 0.120 0.115  2,339 0.054*** 0.072 
RateDum 357 0.642 1.00  2,339 0.217*** 0 
USTR 357 0.165 0.069  2,339 0.051*** 0 
FAssets 357 4,885.070 725.852  2,339 415.270*** 0 
%FAssets 357 0.438 0.398  2,339 0.202*** 0 
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Panel B:  Firms with Non-missing Foreign Segment Sales 
 Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median 
Total Repatriation/Assets 330 0.124 0.082  1,126 N/A N/A 
ΔFPTI 336 -0.031 0.015  1,126 0.001* 0.000 
ΔROA 336 -0.002 -0.001  1,126 0.010** -0.000 
ΔFROA 331 0.014 0.005  1,041 0.009 0.000 
ΔUSROA 331 -0.002 -0.001  1,041 0.018*** 0.005 
ΔMB 336 -0.386 -0.014  1,126 -0.148*** 0.042 
ΔRD 336 -0.001 0.000  1,126 -0.001 0.000 
ΔCapEx 336 -0.004 -0.003  1,126 -0.005 -0.003 
FCF 336 0.120 0.115  1,126 0.055*** 0.067 
RateDum 336 0.628 1.000  1,126 0.384*** 0.000 
USTR 336 0.170 0.164  1,126 0.087*** 0.001 
FAssets 336 4858.52 874.25  1,126 851.55*** 97.62 
%FAssets 336 0.480 0.438  1,126 0.462 0.376 
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TABLE 4 
Characteristics of Repatriating Firms 
Column (1) reports the results of estimating a logit model where the dependent variable, Repatriate, is equal to one if the firm states that it will repatriate under 
the Act, and zero otherwise.   Columns (2) and (3) report the results of estimating a tobit model where the dependent variables are Total Repatriation divided by 
world-wide assets or lagged PRE.  Total Repatriation equals the amount the firm states that it repatriated or plans to repatriate under the Act; PRE equals the 
amount the firm discloses as permanently reinvested earnings in the income tax footnote.  Each of the change variables (Δ) is the mean of the change in the firm’s 
measure over the three-year period 2002 to 2004.  ΔFPTI equals the change in foreign pre-tax income (data273) scaled by world-wide assets (data6); ΔROA is 
the change in net income (data172) scaled by world-wide assets (data6); ΔMB equals the change in the firm’s market to book value ratio 
((data25*data199)/data60); ΔRD equals the change in the ratio of R&D to world-wide assets; ΔCapEx equals the change in capital expenditures (data128) 
divided by world-wide assets; FCF equals average operating cash flows (data308) divided by world-wide assets for the period 2002 to 2004; RateDum equals 
one if the U.S tax rate of 0.35 exceeds the average foreign tax rate (data64/data273) from 2002 through 2004, and zero otherwise; and USTR equals the average 
U.S. tax rate (data63/data272) from 2002 through 2004.  %FAssets is the ratio of FAssets (foreign assets estimated as described in Oler et al. (2007)) to world-
wide assets (data6).  ΔFROA is the change in foreign ROA where FROA is estimated using the process described in Oler et al. (2007).  ΔUSROA is change in 
domestic ROA where USROA is ROA less FROA.  The sample in Panel A includes the 2,696 firms described in Table 1.  The sample in Panel B is only firms 
with non-missing foreign segment sales information.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percent. 
 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
  (1) Repatriate  
(2) 
Total Repatriation/Assets 
 (3) 
Total Repatriation/PRE 
Variable Predicted 
Si
Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  -3.96 -24.45  -0.45 -18.66 -5.83 -16.63 
ΔFPTI - -0.42 -1.96  -0.04 -1.84 -0.30 -0.96 
ΔROA - -3.26 -1.80  -0.42 -2.11 -4.19 -1.55 
ΔMB - -0.09 -1.69  -0.01 -2.19 -0.15 -1.95 
ΔRD - 2.56 0.34  0.28 0.34 -1.76 -0.16 
ΔCapEx - 0.79 0.17  -0.04 -0.09 4.28 0.61 
FCF + 7.15 8.68  0.83 9.30 8.18 6.52 
RateDum + 1.92 10.29  0.21 10.47 2.41 8.37 
USTR + 2.19 4.52  0.21 4.15 2.86 4.02 
%FAssets + 1.26 6.10  0.15 6.77  1.73 5.80 
Scale     0.19        2.53  
Log Likelihood  -793.77   -373.49   -1042.94  
N  2,696 Rep = 357  2,689 Rep = 350  2,624 Rep = 285 
 
 
 
 48
Panel B:  Firms with Non-missing Foreign Segment Sales 
  (1) Repatriate  
(2) 
Total Repatriation/Assets 
 (3) 
Repatriate 
Variable Predicted 
Si
Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept  -2.85 -15.12  -0.35 -14.53 -2.70 -14.16 
ΔFPTI - -0.40 -1.89  -0.04 -1.78   
ΔROA - -3.70 -1.92  -0.50 -2.29   
ΔUSROA -       -2.42 -1.91 
ΔFROA -       -2.44 -1.67 
ΔMB - -0.08 -1.63  -0.01 -2.24 -0.08 -1.45 
ΔRD - 2.13 0.28  0.19 0.22 3.23 0.43 
ΔCapEx - 2.30 0.45  0.03 0.05 1.33 0.25 
FCF + 7.68 8.30  0.96 9.27 7.64 8.07 
RateDum + 1.32 6.91  0.16 7.85 1.31 6.71 
USTR + 1.55 3.18  0.15 2.78 1.46 2.97 
%FAssets + 0.11 0.49  0.03 1.32  0.07 0.33 
Scale     0.19     
Log Likelihood  -672.25   -292.85   -652.88  
N  1,462 Rep = 336  1,456 Rep = 330  1,372 Rep = 331 
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TABLE 5 
Total Repurchases for Partitions Based on Repatriation Plans 
This table reports mean repurchases as a percent of assets and total repurchases by quarter for repatriating and non-
repatriating firms.  Repatriating firms are those that state that they will repatriate under the Act in fiscal year 2004 or 
2005.  Non-repatriating firms are those that state that they will not repatriate under the Act or do not mention the tax 
holiday.  ShrRep is repurchases as a percent of assets measured as the change in treasury stock (data226) scaled by 
world-wide assets (data44) then multiplied by 100.  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases 
equals zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we estimate share repurchases as repurchases 
of common and preferred stock from the statement of cash flows (data93) less decreases in preferred stock (change 
in data55 and data71).  Total Repurchases are the unscaled repurchases reported in $ millions.  We eliminate 
observations in the top 0.5 percent of ShrRep. 
 Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
Period N ShrRep (Mean in %) 
Total 
Repurchases 
 N ShrRep (Mean in %) 
Total 
Repurchases 
        
2003: Q1 357 0.64 12,782.7  2,335 0.30 9,631.2 
2003: Q2 357 0.48 16,456.4  2,337 0.23 8,701.7 
2003: Q3 357 0.56 17,931.6  2,335 0.20 11,571.7 
2003: Q4 357 0.60 25,064.4  2,337 0.25 15,232.8 
2003 
Total  2.28 72,235.1   0.97 45,137.4 
2004: Q1 356 0.65 22,631.3  2,337 0.30 14,727.8 
2004: Q2 357 0.69 21,509.2  2,336 0.32 19,880.2 
2004: Q3 357 0.89 28,619.1  2,337 0.38 20,299.1 
2004: Q4 357 0.72 28,041.9  2,338 0.36 23,532.6 
2004 
Total  2.96 100,801.5   1.35 78,439.7 
2005: Q1 356 0.92 33,450.8  2,338 0.35 23,563.5 
2005: Q2 357 1.07 42,086.8  2,336 0.48 27,089.6 
2005: Q3 356 1.18 40,289.6  2,329 0.42 27,639.3 
2005: Q4 357 1.15 50,579.9  2,326 0.50 33,375.0 
2005 
Total  4.32 166,407.1   1.75 111,667.4 
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TABLE 6 
Total Dividend Payments for Partitions Based on Repatriation Plans 
This table reports mean repurchases as a percent of assets and total repurchases by quarter for repatriating and non-
repatriating firms.  Repatriating firms are those that report in their financial statements that they will repatriate under 
the Act in fiscal year 2004 or 2005.  Non-repatriating firms are those that state that they will not repatriate under the 
Act or do not mention the tax holiday.  Dividends equals dividends as a percent of assets calculated as quarterly 
dividends per share times total shares outstanding (data16*data61), divided by world-wide assets (data44) then 
multiplied by 100.  Total Dividends is dividends per share times total shares outstanding (data16*data61), in $ 
millions.  We eliminate observations in the top 0.5 percent of Dividends. 
 Repatriating Firms  Non-Repatriating Firms 
Period N Dividends (Mean in %) 
Total 
Dividends  N 
Dividends 
(Mean in %) 
Total  
Dividends 
        
2003: Q1 357 0.27 16,495.7  2,333 0.24 11,545.7 
2003: Q2 357 0.28 16,792.3  2,334 0.36 12,803.6 
2003: Q3 357 0.37 16,862.7  2,334 0.48 13,741.1 
2003: Q4 357 0.37 21,302.6  2,338 0.44 14,735.4 
2003 
Total  1.29 71,453.3   1.51 52,825.8 
2004: Q1 357 0.30 17,655.5  2,337 0.36 14,479.2 
2004: Q2 357 0.45 18,571.4  2,336 0.43 14,992.0 
2004: Q3 357 0.34 19,782.7  2,335 0.39 16,527.0 
2004: Q4 357 0.52 54,998.7  2,339 0.45 16,675.3 
2004 
Total  1.61 111,008.3   1.63 62,673.6 
2005: Q1 357 0.45 21,880.9  2,337 0.44 16,159.8 
2005: Q2 356 0.34 21,408.6  2,336 0.52 17,980.2 
2005: Q3 356 0.33 21,069.4  2,328 0.48 17,869.7 
2005: Q4 357 0.46 25,209.2  2,326 0.66 19,598.7 
2005 
Total  1.57 89,568.1   2.11 71,608.4 
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TABLE 7 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
The sample includes firm-quarters from the first quarter of 1989 to the fourth quarter of 2005 with data available to calculate all regression variables, excluding 
firms incorporated outside the U.S., financial services firms, insurance companies, firms with no foreign activity in the previous three years, and firms with 
negative book values.  ΔPayout is the sum of ΔShrRep and ΔDividends.  ΔShrRep is the quarterly change in treasury stock (data226) scaled by world-wide assets 
(data44).  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases equals zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we estimate share 
repurchases as repurchases of common and preferred stock from the statement of cash flows (data93) less decreases in preferred stock (change in data55 and 
data71).  Dividends is the change from quarter t-4 to quarter t in dividends per share times total shares outstanding (data16 * data61)) scaled by world-wide assets 
(data44).  MaxRep is the amount the firm reports that it has repatriated or plans to repatriate divided by world-wide assets.  PostAct equals one for the four 
quarters of 2005, zero otherwise.  Repatriate equals one if the firm states that it will repatriated under to the Act.  Size is the log of the market value of equity.  
Market value of equity equals price (data14) times common shares outstanding (data61).  ΔCapEx is the change in the ratio of capital expenditures (data90) to 
world-wide assets (data44) from the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t.  ΔROA is the change in the ratio of annualized net income (data69*4) 
to world-wide assets (data44) from quarter t-1 to quarter t.  ROA is the ratio of annualized net income (data69*4) to world-wide assets (data44).  Debt is the ratio 
of long-term debt (data51) plus the debt included in current liabilities (data45) to world-wide assets (data44).  DivYld  is dividends per share (data16) scaled by 
price (data14).  ΔCash is the change in the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (data36) to world-wide assets (data44) from the beginning of quarter t-4 to the 
beginning of quarter t. ΔPenalty equals the change in the dividend tax penalty from quarter t-4 to quarter t and the dividend tax penalty equals the dividend tax 
rate minus the capital gain tax rate divided by one minus the capital gain tax rate.   
 QTR1  QTR2  QTR3  QTR4 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
N 28,171 28,171  28,921 28,921  29,192 29,192  29,280 29,280 
ΔPayout 0.00027 0.00000  0.00039 0.00000  0.00032 0.00000  0.00036 0.00000 
ΔShrRep 0.00027 0.00000  0.00035 0.00000  0.00029 0.00000  0.00037 0.00000 
ΔDividends 0.00001 0.00000  0.00004 0.00000  0.00002 0.00000  0.00002 0.00000 
MaxRep 0.04296 0.00000  0.04454 0.00000  0.04331 0.00000  0.04079 0.00000 
PostAct 0.09517 0.00000  0.09267 0.00000  0.09201 0.00000  0.09177 0.00000 
Repatriate 0.15811 0.00000  0.15992 0.00000  0.15905 0.00000  0.15881 0.00000 
Size 5.65191 5.60495  5.65372 5.59172  5.68094 5.63616  5.66595 5.61139 
ΔCapEx -0.00083 0.00000  -0.00078 0.00000  -0.00077 0.00000  -0.00071 0.00000 
ΔROA 0.00683 -0.00328  0.01293 0.00642  -0.00196 0.00014  -0.01368 -0.00070 
ROA 0.01145 0.03843  0.02407 0.04791  0.02110 0.04698  0.00695 0.04629 
Debt 0.21363 0.18376  0.21807 0.18988  0.21782 0.19001  0.21733 0.18958 
DivYld 0.00287 0.00000  0.00278 0.00000  0.00280 0.00000  0.00271 0.00000 
ΔCash -0.00095 0.00009  -0.00034 0.00005  -0.00071 0.00004  -0.00076 0.00000 
ΔPenalty -0.01522 0.00000  -0.01354 0.00000  -0.01329 0.00000  -0.01333 0.00000 
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TABLE 8 
Regression Analysis of Changes in Total Payout, Repurchases, and Dividends around the Act 
The sample includes firm-quarters from the first quarter of 1989 to the fourth quarter of 2005 with data available to calculate all regression variables, excluding firms incorporated 
outside the U.S., financial services firms, insurance companies, firms with no foreign activity in the previous three years, and firms with negative book values.  ΔPayout is the sum 
of ΔShrRep and ΔDividends.  ΔShrRep is the change from quarter t-4 to quarter t in repurchases measured as the change in treasury stock (data226) scaled by world-wide assets 
(data44).  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases equals zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we estimate share repurchases as 
repurchases of common and preferred stock from the statement of cash flows (data93) less decreases in preferred stock (change in data55 and data71).   ΔDividends is the change 
from quarter t-4 to quarter t in dividends per share times total shares outstanding (data16 * data61)) scaled by world-wide assets (data44).  PostAct equals one for the four quarters 
of 2005, zero otherwise.  Repatriate equals 1 if the firm states that it will repatriate under to the Act.  MaxRep is the amount the firm reports that it has repatriated or plans to 
repatriate divided by world-wide assets. Size is the log of the market value of equity.  Market value of equity equals price (data14) times common shares outstanding (data61).  
ΔCapEx is the change in the ratio of capital expenditures (data90) to world-wide assets (data44) from the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t.  ΔROA is the 
change in the ratio of net income (data69*4) to world-wide assets (data44) from quarter t-1 to quarter t.  ROA is the ratio of net income (data69*4) to world-wide assets (data44).  
Debt is the ratio of long-term debt (data51) plus debt in current liabilities (data45) to world-wide assets (data44).  DivYld is dividends per share (data16) scaled by price (data14).  
ΔCash is the change in the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (data36) to world-wide assets (data44) from the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t. ΔPenalty equals 
the change in the dividend tax penalty from quarter t-4 to quarter t and the dividend tax penalty equals the dividend tax rate minus the capital gain tax rate divided by one minus the 
capital gain tax rate. 
Panel A:  Compustat Measures 
Variable  (1) ΔPayout  (2) ΔDividends  (3) ΔShrRep  (4) ΔShrRep 
 Pred. Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.00084 1.96 0.00026 2.55 0.00020 0.43 0.00025 0.56 
PostAct ? 0.00148 7.96 0.00041 6.60 0.00111 6.19 0.00126 7.16 
Repatriate ? -0.00027 -1.71 -0.00002 -0.71 -0.00026 -1.69   
PostAct*Repatriate + 0.00281 4.44 0.00004 0.27 0.00277 4.28   
MaxRep ?       -0.00001 -0.09 
PostAct*MaxRep +       0.01937 3.47 
Sizet-1  + 0.00016 6.84 -0.00001 -2.03 0.00020 8.67 0.00019 8.36 
ΔCapExt-1  - -0.00063 -0.38 -0.00008 -0.12 -0.00086 -0.51 -0.00081 -0.48 
ΔROAt ? -0.00111 -4.49 -0.00043 -5.58 -0.00042 -1.71 -0.00041 -1.66 
ROAt + 0.00333 12.34 0.00086 9.80 0.00203 8.02 0.00201 7.93 
Debtt-1  - -0.00404 -16.96 -0.00096 -11.36 -0.00308 -13.71 -0.00309 -13.78 
DivYldt-1  ?/- -0.02956 -2.81 0.00017 0.03 -0.04889 -6.07 -0.04918 -6.09 
ΔCasht-1  + 0.00530 10.43 0.00090 5.26 0.00508 10.22 0.00509 10.23 
ΔPenaltyt +/- 0.00140 2.63 -0.00201 -12.27 0.00339 6.50 0.00334 6.38 
ΔPayoutt-4 - -0.44744 -52.37       
ΔDividendst-4 -   -0.32621 -15.77     
ΔShrRept-4  -      -0.45828 -51.50 -0.45819 -51.41 
N  114,973   114,973   115,564   115,020  
Adj. R Square  0.1844   0.0693   0.1986   0.1984  
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TABLE 8 Continued 
Panel B:  CRSP Measures 
Variable  (1) ΔPayout  (2) ΔDividends  (3) ΔShrRep  (4) ΔShrRep 
 Pred. Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.00076 1.55 0.00019 2.22 0.00031 0.73 0.00041 0.96 
PostAct ? 0.00099 4.58 0.00028 5.89 0.00073 3.99 0.00088 4.94 
Repatriate ? -0.00047 -2.81 -0.00006 -2.16 -0.00037 -2.49   
PostAct* 
Repatriate + 0.00267 3.93 0.00017 1.21 0.00254 4.23   
MaxRep ?       -0.00008 -0.81 
PostAct*MaxRep +       0.01671 3.09 
Sizet-1  + 0.00010 3.92 0.00000 -0.23 0.00013 5.61 0.00011 5.05 
ΔCapExt-1  - 0.00296 1.48 -0.00003 -0.06 0.00287 1.63 0.00284 1.61 
ΔROAt ? -0.00118 -3.91 -0.00031 -5.35 -0.00054 -2.17 -0.00052 -2.11 
ROAt + 0.00313 9.29 0.00071 9.61 0.00160 5.95 0.00159 5.87 
Debtt-1  - -0.00360 -13.25 -0.00084 -11.00 -0.00212 -9.84 -0.00215 -9.98 
DivYldt-1  ?/- -0.00589 -0.53 -0.00105 -0.23 -0.03582 -4.90 -0.03618 -4.94 
ΔCasht-1  + 0.00327 5.68 0.00063 4.62 0.00203 4.22 0.00202 4.20 
ΔPenaltyt +/- 0.00025 0.40 -0.00183 -12.55 0.00302 5.69 0.00294 5.53 
ΔPayoutt-4 - -0.47069 -51.73       
ΔDividendst-4 -   -0.32009 -15.71     
ΔShrRept-4  -      -0.47820 -56.89 -0.47840 -56.76 
N  115,564   115,564   115,569   115,569  
Adj. R Square  0.2031   0.0714   0.2150   0.2149  
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TABLE 9 
Results of Two Stage Model to Correct for Self-selection Bias 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Repatriate, a dummy variable equal to one for firms that repatriate under the Act.  The 
coefficients in Panel A are estimated using a Probit regression.  FPTI is the mean ratio of foreign pre-tax income to world-wide 
assets from 2002 through 2004.  ROA is the mean ratio of net income to world-wide assets from 2002 through 2004.  Assets is the 
log of world-wide assets at the end of 2004.  All other variables in Panel A are defined in Table 3.The dependent variable in 
Panel B is the annual change from 2004 to 2005 in total repurchases, ΔShrRep, measured as the change in treasury stock scaled 
by world-wide assets.  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases equals zero.  For those firms that do not use 
the treasury stock method, we estimate share repurchases as repurchases of common and preferred stock from the statement of 
cash flows less decreases in preferred stock.   The coefficients in Panel B are estimated using a two-step procedure to control for 
self-selection in the decision to repatriate and includes the inverse Mills ratio from the probit estimation. Standard errors are 
corrected for correlation between the equations (Maddala 1983).  Size is the log of the market value of equity at the end of 2004.  
ΔCapEx is the change in the ratio of capital expenditures to world-wide assets from the beginning of 2004 to the beginning of 
2005. ΔROA is the change in the ratio of net income to world-wide assets from 2004 to 2005.  Debt is the ratio of long-term debt 
plus debt in current liabilities to world-wide assets at the end of 2004.  DivYld is 2004 dividends per share scaled by price.  
ΔCash is the change in the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to world-wide assets from the beginning of 2004 to the beginning of 
2005.  The sample includes 2,690 firms with necessary Compustat data available for the period 2001 to 2005, excluding firms 
with negative book values, firms incorporated outside the U.S, insurance companies, financial services firms, and firms with 
missing foreign activity in each of the previous three years. 
Panel A: Probit Model of Repatriation 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient z-statistic 
Intercept  -2.15110 -25.33 
ΔFPTI - -0.29828 -2.31 
Δ ROA - -2.33869 -2.21 
Δ MB - -0.02027 -0.65 
Δ RD - 2.21524 0.51 
Δ CapEx - -1.29853 -0.48 
FCF + 2.54592 4.68 
RateDum + 0.88904 7.98 
USTR + 0.83603 2.81 
%FAssets + 0.56244 4.53 
FPTI + 10.74749 7.02 
ROA + 0.84656 2.21 
Assets + 0.00001 4.89 
N  2,696  
Panel B: Repurchases Model 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient z-statistic 
Intercept  -0.00911 -1.37 
Repatriate + 0.00978 2.15 
Size + 0.00288 6.67 
Δ CapEx - -0.00200 -0.09 
Δ ROA + 0.00710 1.94 
Debt  - -0.01927 -4.52 
DivYld  ? -0.14119 -2.72 
Δ Cash  + 0.00761 3.04 
Δ ShrRept-1 - -0.43807 -20.56 
Inv. Mills Ratio ? -0.00911 -1.37 
N  2,696  
Wald Chi Square  541.15  
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TABLE 10 
Sensitivity Tests of Changes in Repurchases around the Act  
The dependent variable in Column (1) is abnormal repurchases calculated by estimating the following equation by firm for years t-5 through t-1:  ΔShrRept= γ0 + γ1ROAt + γ2ShrRept-1 + ηt.  Abnormal repurchases equals ΔShrRept minus the predicted value from this equation.  The dependent variable in Column (2) repeats the same process using ΔPayout in place of ΔShrRep.  The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is ΔShrRep.  The sample includes firm-quarters from the first quarter of 1989 to the fourth quarter of 
2005 with data available to calculate all regression variables, excluding firms incorporated outside the U.S., financial services firms, insurance companies, firms with no foreign 
activity in the previous three years, and firms with negative book values.  In Column (3) we also eliminate firm-years for which ΔShrRep equals zero. In Column (4) we also 
eliminate firms that do not report foreign segment sales.  ΔShrRep is the change from quarter t-4 to quarter t in repurchases measured as the change in treasury stock (data226) 
scaled by world-wide assets (data44).  If there is a net decrease in treasury stock, then repurchases equals zero.  For those firms that do not use the treasury stock method, we 
estimate share repurchases as repurchases of common and preferred stock from the statement of cash flows (data 93) less decreases in preferred stock (change in data55 and 
data71).  PostAct equals one for the four quarters of 2005, zero otherwise.  Repatriate equals 1 if the firm states that it will repatriate under the Act.  Size is the log of the market 
value of equity (price (data14) times common shares outstanding (data61)).  ΔCapEx is the change in the ratio of capital expenditures (data90) to world-wide assets (data44) from 
the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t. ΔROA is the change in the ratio of net income (data69*4) to world-wide assets (data44) from quarter t-1 to quarter t.  Debt 
is the ratio of long-term debt (data51) plus debt in current liabilities (data45) to world-wide assets (data44).  DivYld is dividends per share (data16) scaled by price (data14).  ΔCash 
is the change in the ratio of cash and cash equivalents (data36) to world-wide assets (data44) from the beginning of quarter t-4 to the beginning of quarter t.  ΔPenalty equals the 
change in the dividend tax penalty from quarter t-4 to quarter t and the dividend tax penalty equals the dividend tax rate minus the capital gain tax rate divided by one minus the 
capital gain tax rate. 
Abnormal Repurchases and Payout Reduced Samples Variable  (1) Abnormal Repurchases  (2) Abnormal Payout  (3) Non-Zero Observations  (4) Segment Sample 
 Pred. Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient z-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? 0.00059 1.60 0.00086 2.07 0.00318 2.68 0.00083 0.88 
PostAct ? 0.00027 1.87 0.00031 1.81 0.00381 7.25 0.00145 5.28 
Repatriate ? 0.00058 3.72 0.00102 5.92 -0.00086 -2.63 -0.00016 -0.89 
PostAct* 
Repatriate + 0.00219 3.75 0.00175 2.77 0.00254 2.26 0.00229 3.26 
Sizet-1  + 0.00050 21.34 0.00077 29.76 0.00029 5.08 0.00024 6.90 
ΔCapExt-1  - 0.00070 0.44 -0.00002 -0.01 -0.00373 -0.62 0.00119 0.55 
ΔROAt ? -0.00061 -3.35 -0.00067 -3.14 -0.00221 -2.46 -0.00029 -1.23 
ROAt +     0.00775 7.58 0.00076 1.48 
Debtt-1  - -0.00362 -16.54 -0.00666 -24.23 -0.00896 -13.77 -0.00487 -11.89 
DivYldt-1  ? -0.04177 -5.36 0.33617 26.77 -0.14717 -7.29 -0.00768 -2.84 
ΔCasht-1  + 0.00147 4.05 0.00135 3.29 0.01753 10.24 0.00614 8.21 
ΔPenaltyt + 0.00304 5.65 0.00412 6.83 0.01032 6.98 0.00449 5.69 
ΔShrRept-4 -     -0.59108 -58.14 -0.45600 -39.59 
N  101,770   101,468   42,818   64,334  
Adj. R Square  0.0201   0.0588   0.2663   0.1994  
 
